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26 MAY 1988



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Ontario Demonstrators Protest Cruise Missile Flights

52200020 Windsor *THE SATURDAY WINDSOR STAR* in English 2 Apr 88 p D12

[Text] Sault Ste. Marie, Ont. (CP)—More than 100 people protesting the training flights of U.S. bombers over Northern Ontario released a net of helium-filled balloons into the sky on Good Friday to symbolize their crusade for peace.

"Refuse the cruise" was among the messages displayed by the 100 anti-cruise missile demonstrators gathered in the parking lot of a former grocery store.

From a distance the gathering resembled a carnival, with the colorful net of balloons waving in the wind, children running in every direction, and hawkers selling peace buttons.

But members of the Sault and District Peace Association quickly reminded the demonstrators they were there to draw attention to the U.S. Air Force training flights, scheduled to begin Friday.

The test flights of B-52 Bombers and F-111 fighter bombers are planned to occur 100 meters above the ground along a 400-km corridor between North Bay and the Agawa Canyon, north of Sault Ste. Marie.

Peace Association spokesmen Chris Reid called the testing a "first strike strategy," referring to a nuclear attack, which "Canada should have no part of."

Don Jackson, a political science professor at Algoma University College, said no testing has been done to determine the environmental impact of testing the bombers at such low levels.

"Let's get rid of those flights over our land," he urged. "The funds should be used for hospitals, schools, peace and education."

After the demonstration, supporters piled into the back of a pickup truck and drove north with their balloons and placards.

Before they released the helium-filled balloons into the sky, they cut up the net so it would not become tangled in flying objects.

Similar demonstrations were planned in the Northern Ontario cities of North Bay and New Liskeard.

/9738

Beijing Pessimistic on Signing of START Treaty at Summit

OW0905044388 *Beijing in English to North America*
0300 GMT 27 Apr 88

[Text] American Secretary of State George Schultz and his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze have just concluded a 2-day meeting in Moscow in preparation for another Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Moscow next month. As our Washington correspondent Zhang Guohua says, the prospects for the signing of a U.S.-Soviet strategic arms at the Moscow summit are not likely despite the Schultz-Shevardnadze meeting.

U.S.-Soviet relations in the past 2 and 1/2 years are often characterized by Reagan-Gorbachev summit meetings and a series of Schultz-Shevardnadze talks that lead to the summits. The latest Schultz-Shevardnadze talks in Moscow last Thursday and Friday were clearly troubleshooting exchanges aimed at floating President Reagan's planned trip to Moscow and ironing out differences on some key issues that will be discussed at the Moscow summit.

At the last Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Washington last December, both sides signed a landmark treaty eliminating all their medium- and short-range nuclear missiles. They also pledged efforts to negotiate a second treaty cutting the superpowers' strategic arms by 50 percent, hopefully in time for signature at the Moscow summit. Although U.S.-Soviet negotiators have been bargaining hard in Geneva and Schultz and Shevardnadze have made efforts in a series of meetings to make headway, prospects for the signing of the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms treaty at the Moscow summit remain as slim as ever. In a joint communique issued at the end of the Schultz-Shevardnadze talks in Moscow, including a meeting with Gorbachev, both sides promised to make intensive efforts to complete a strategic arms treaty within the shortest time possible. However, they did not

even mention the previously declared objective of signing the treaty at the Moscow summit. Observers believe that although the absence of a strategic arms treaty will probably not threaten the Moscow summit itself, the failure to make significant progress in some key areas came as disappointment to many people.

According to TASS reports, in his meeting with Secretary Schultz, Mikhail Gorbachev sharply criticized President Reagan for his recent remarks, which suggest that his go tough policy from a position of strength has forced the Soviet Union to the bargaining table. The remarks by President Reagan and the criticisms by General Secretary Gorbachev are certainly not elements that will help improve the atmosphere prior to and at the Moscow summit.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze summarized major U.S.-Soviet differences on the strategic arms treaty as five not's, such as problems concerning nonwithdrawal from the 1972 Antiballistic Missiles Treaty, sea launched cruise missiles, air launched cruise missiles, mobile missiles, and verifications.

Apart from arms control, both sides differ sharply on many other issues. Take regional conflicts for example: Although the Soviet Union has agreed to start withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan 2 weeks before the Moscow summit, both sides still blame each other on the future military aid issue; and Schultz and Shevardnadze found their positions as far apart as before on the Gulf war, the Middle East problem, and the Central American conflict. There will be another Schultz-Shevardnadze meeting before the Reagan-Gorbachev Moscow summit, and no major breakthrough is either expected or likely. Some Washington observers say that signing of a U.S.-Soviet strategic arms treaty is not only impossible at the Moscow summit, but highly unlikely during the remainder of the Reagan presidency. They don't expect the Moscow summit to make major substantive progress on other issues either.

NEW ZEALAND

General Staff 'Expert' Writes on Pacific Naval Strategy

52001070 Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD
in English 21 Mar 88 p 8

[Article by Oleg Lisov, military expert with the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff: "Russia Seeks Naval Balance in Pacific"]

[Text] The Soviet Union and the United States are the major Pacific powers and the security of the region depends a great deal on their attitude to the problem of lessening military tension and scaling down naval activity.

To understand the Soviet position, one should bear in mind that the Soviet Union, guided by the principles of its defensive military doctrine, has never sought to achieve naval superiority.

The chief aim of the Soviet Pacific Fleet is to protect the Soviet Far East from aggression from the sea. In line with this concept, the structure and composition of the Soviet Pacific Fleet are geared to the implementation of various military tasks, both tactical and strategic, whose only aim is to ensure the defence of the USSR.

It should be noted that the Soviet Pacific Fleet is maintained at the level of reasonable sufficiency, which is the fundamental principle of the Soviet military doctrine.

And the level or reasonable sufficiency depends on the activities of the United States and its allies.

Coastline Defence

The Soviet Pacific Fleet is designed to fight enemy naval forces, defend the coastline and inland regions of Soviet territory from sea-launched strikes and counter the activities of United States aircraft-carrier forces.

The Soviet Pacific-Fleet is not designed for attack at any foreign territory. It has relatively small amphibious and marine forces which are necessary for the defence of the long Soviet coastline from the Cape of Chukotka to Zolotoi Rog Bay, including the Kamchatka Peninsula, the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk, Sakhalin Island and other areas of Soviet territory.

In modernising United States naval forces and escalating their activity, the Pentagon says that this is a necessary counter to a growing Soviet threat.

However, the growing defence capabilities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet are, we feel, designed to counter the growing offensive capabilities of the United States Pacific Fleet.

In justifying the United States naval buildup the Pentagon says that the Soviet naval forces in the Pacific outnumber the American forces in the region. These allegations, however, are based on calculations which are neither objective nor balanced.

Though the United States Navy in the Pacific includes the Third and Seventh Fleets, the weapons and personnel of the Third Fleet are not taken into account for some reason.

If they are included in the balance, the United States naval forces will have a 50 percent advantage in big ships and an 80 percent disadvantage in submarines.

It should be noted that for some time the Soviet Union has not been increasing the number of missile submarines in the Pacific.

Replying to the well-known charges by the United States Pacific forces commander, admiral Ronald Hays, Soviet military experts said that the overall number of Soviet missile submarines in the region had decreased.

The United States has launched a series of Ticonderoga-class missile cruisers, Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered submarines and Iowa-class battleships.

Armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles, they have substantially broadened the traditional functions of the United States Navy.

At the present time not only aircraft-carriers but also escort ships can deliver strikes at coastal targets as well as deep strikes.

The deployment of cruise missiles on submarines and surface ships has greatly increased the offensive capabilities of the United States Pacific Fleet.

Any United States submarine or surface ship operating off the coast of any country can carry very high-accuracy nuclear-tipped tomahawk missiles, capable of a range of 2600 kilometres.

To modernise the naval air force, the United States has supplied it with new nuclear-capable F/A-18 and AV-8B Harrier assault planes.

The system of basing should also be taken into account in comparing the Soviet and American naval capabilities.

The Seventh Fleet's strike forces are deployed in immediate proximity to the territory of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries of Asia.

In the Pacific the United States has a developed system of forward-based facilities in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, which are linked with the United States bases in the Hawaiian and Mariana Islands and at Guam.

This system of overseas installations, situated many thousands of kilometres from United States territory, considerably enhances the United States naval capabilities in the Pacific.

This geographical factor is essential in any comparative analysis of the Soviet and American naval forces in the region.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet is based on Soviet territory. The West argues sometimes that the Soviet Union has a "forward base" at Cam Ranh Bay.

Actually, it is a temporary logistic supply station used by Soviet ships under an agreement with Vietnam.

The Soviet Union does not use the territory of Cam Ranh on lease. In accordance with generally accepted international regulations, Soviet ships call in at Cam Ranh Bay to restore their fuel, food and water supplies, make repairs and give their crews a rest.

The USSR has no intention of turning Cam Ranh Bay into a military base and in 1987 the number of Soviet ships calling in there declined.

There is not a single Soviet ship off the Pacific coast of the United States, whereas in immediate proximity to the Soviet Far East, United States naval forces conduct activities in line with the notorious "new naval strategy," which envisages the delivery of a first strike at Soviet ships and the Russian Far Eastern coast.

Intensified Activity

The strategy of "advanced naval frontiers" envisages isolating the Soviet Pacific Fleet, blocking its access to the open sea and delivering aircraft-carrier and sea-launched cruise missile strikes at Soviet territory.

This makes the Soviet Union take counter-measures to strengthen its defence capabilities in the Far East.

In the last few years the United States naval forces have greatly intensified their activity off the Soviet coast. United States naval strike forces constantly operate in Soviet territorial waters, simulating attacks on targets on Soviet territories.

The holding of annual United States naval exercises, codenamed Fleetex, Brim Frost and Team Spirit, and the deployment of a major United States naval force in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk bear this out.

Last November the United States conducted in the Bering Sea a new exercise, codenamed Norpacex. It involved a naval force led by the nuclear aircraft-carrier Enterprise, a large number of warplanes and units of the Alaska coastguard Service and showed that the United States continued to build up its naval presence in the North Pacific.

The exercise was centred on Adak, one of the Aleutian Islands.

Admiral Vladimir Sidorov, deputy commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, said that in 1987 the United States conducted more naval exercises in the Pacific than in 1986. The Soviet naval activities in the region remained at the same level.

The Soviet Union believes that the situation in the Pacific calls for Soviet-American talks on lowering the level of military activity and confrontation in the region.

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INTRABLOC

Warsaw Pact Military Committee Confers in Sofia

Session Opens

*AU1105181488 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian
1730 GMT 11 May 88*

[Text] A regular session of the Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States opened in Sofia today. Taking part are delegations from the armies of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, the CSSR, and the Headquarters of the Joint Armed Forces.

The session was opened by Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces.

Army General Dobri Dzhurov made a greetings speech to the participants.

The session is taking place in a businesslike atmosphere and in a spirit of unity and complete cooperation.

Bulgarian Defense Minister Speaks

*AU1105151188 Sofia BTA in English
1418 GMT 11 May 88*

[Text] Sofia, May 11 (BTA)—The Warsaw Treaty Joint Armed Forces' Military Council opened its session here today. It is attended by Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor G. Kulikov, commander in chief of the Warsaw Treaty Member States' Joint Armed Forces, and by Army General Anatoliy I. Gribkov, chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces.

Welcoming the participants in the session, Army General Dobri Dzhurov, Politburo member of the CC of the BCP and Bulgaria's minister of national defence, said that the fraternal socialist countries are now leading a worldwide struggle for saving mankind from a nuclear holocaust and for disarmament.

The Bulgarian defence chief said he was convinced that the issues considered at the session and the recommendations which will be made will help enhance the military strength of the joint armed forces and promote and strengthen the friendship among the socialist countries.

Proposals to NATO Debated

*LD1105220488 Warsaw Television Service in Polish
1730 GMT 11 May 88*

[No video available]

[Text] One and a half months after the session of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee, which was held in Sofia and during which a new concept of the peace plan for Europe was worked out, the Warsaw Pact Military Committee has met in Sofia.

The subject of its debates is the military variant of the political proposal put forward by our alliance to Western Europe and NATO.

The meeting is being attended by representatives of the Pact members states. The Polish delegation is headed by General Antoni Jasinski.

Discussion of Pact Doctrine, Organization

*AU1705200188 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian
16 May 88 p 4*

[Captain Ivan Genov article, under rubric "Weekly International Review"]

[Text] The session of the Military Council of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces in Sofia coincided with the 33d anniversary of the fraternal defensive alliance. This provides a further reason for singling the session out from the flow of events, despite the working nature of the meeting.

Very often we devote a lot of space in our international columns to reports and commentaries on the military preparations of the United States and NATO. Materials appear rather more seldom on the activities of the Warsaw Pact aimed at strengthening the collective defensive capability and on the tasks that the military organs of the alliance are resolving. At the same time, many of our readers are interested in the military organization of the alliance—whether we are falling behind the United States or NATO in any respect, and so forth.

Problems relating to the preparation and conduct of defensive actions by the Joint Armed Forces are a primary task in the activity of the Warsaw Pact military leadership. This task stems from the fundamental premise of our collective military doctrine that the armed forces of the allied states are maintained at a sufficient state of combat readiness to prevent them from being taken by surprise and, in the event of an attack being launched against them, to enable them to crushingly repel the aggressor. Here our efforts are totally subordinate to the main political task of the modern day, namely to prevent any war, whether nuclear or conventional.

The organization system of the alliance reliably guarantees the fulfillment of these tasks. "The system contains no superfluous units," Army General Anatoliy Gribkov, chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, stated in an interview. "The military organization of our alliance: the Defense Ministers Committee, the Joint Command, the Headquarters Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, and the national ministries of defense are doing everything necessary to maintain the armed forces of the fraternal countries at a level of combat readiness that will enable them to repulse any attack from outside against any state of the socialist community. Their activity is responsive in nature and, what is more, is far

removed from the intention to increase the armed forces and arms of the allied states beyond the level required for defense and repelling possible aggression."

In the world, however, the threat of war remains. The West is continually stepping up its militarist preparations. In this situation the Warsaw Pact military leadership, when discussing at its sessions the priority tasks for strengthening peace and security, inevitably concentrates its attention on increasing the defensive might of the allied states to such a level as to exclude the military supremacy of imperialism over socialism. There is no doubt that the Sofia session that has just ended has made its own contribution to this goal.

Pact Commission for Disarmament Questions Meets 10-12 May

*LD1205194488 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1800 GMT 12 May 88*

[Text] The second session of the Warsaw Pact states' Special Commission for Disarmament Questions was held in Warsaw 10-12 May. It examined activities aimed at speeding up the negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe and the situation at the consultations between representatives of the Warsaw Pact states and NATO in Vienna, on working out their mandate. Work was continued on a joint concept for future negotiations and on possible means of preventing the threat of a sudden attack. There was also discussion of other issues concerning arms limitation, disarmament, confidence-building and security measures, and the commission's further work.

Shevardnadze Briefs Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers

Discusses Summit Preparations

*LD1305141688 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1305 GMT 13 May 88*

[Text] Berlin, 13 May ADN—A meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member states took place in Berlin on 13 May 1988. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Politburo member of the CPSU Central Committee, informed his colleagues about his talks in Geneva with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in preparation for the Moscow summit.

There foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member states expressed their full support for the USSR's approach to the negotiations with the United States and their hope that the negotiations between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan will produce substantial agreements for halving strategic offensive weapons and on other disarmament questions, as well as in bilateral agreements. The meeting took place in a fraternal atmosphere.

The meeting was attended by Bulgarian Foreign Minister P. Mladenov, Hungarian Foreign Minister P. Varkonyi, GDR Foreign minister O. Fischer, Polish Foreign Minister M. Orzechowski, Romanian Ambassador to the GDR G. Caranfil in his capacity as representative of the minister of foreign affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania, USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze, and CSSR Foreign Minister B. Chnoupek.

Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, received the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member states for a talk. It took place in an atmosphere of fraternal friendship.

Following the foreign ministers' discussion, Oskar Fischer and the other participants met for a joint luncheon at Schloss Niederschoenhausen.

USSR Stance on Disarmament Supported

*LD1305135600 Warsaw PAP in English
1325 GMT 13 May 88*

[Text] Berlin, May 13—The foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member states started a meeting here today to look at the results of the talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz which ended yesterday in Geneva.

Poland is represented at the meeting by Marian Orzechowski. The foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member states supported the line adopted by the Soviet Union in the negotiations with the United States and expressed the hope that the approaching talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan would be crowned with essential agreements concerning a 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons, as well as other disarmaments issues and bilateral relations.

After the meeting, the ministers were received by general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Chairman of the GDR's Council of State Erich Honecker.

Commentary on Warsaw Pact Anniversary, 'Assymetric' Solutions

*AU1805084788 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in
Bulgarian 14 May 88 p 4*

[Petur Kozhukharov article: "Loyalty to Socialism and World Peace" on the 33rd anniversary of the signing of the Warsaw Pact. Passages in boldface as published]

[Text] What is traditional and what is new about the Warsaw Pact? It is logical that this question should be asked precisely today, as we mark the 33rd anniversary of the establishment of this military-political alliance among European socialist countries.

The atmosphere in which the seven socialist countries have been protecting peace throughout the last 3 decades is marked by a dynamic pace of political development both in Europe and the world. If it is true that the Warsaw Pact has always conformed to the requirement of settling international problems through political means and in a peaceful manner, the skill, methods, and approaches of achieving this goal have been constantly developed and improved, and this includes the rejection of a series of theoretical-tactical concepts that are already outdated, or are becoming outdated.

There was a time when peace could be effectively protected only through successfully catching up with the opponent in the field of conventional arms, but especially in the field of missile-nuclear armaments. The military parity with NATO that has been achieved ensured an equal level of security. However, even prior to this watershed in world politics, the Warsaw Pact member states systematically proposed realistic and feasible ideas in trying to halt the arms and armaments' race. However, when parity became an undeniable fact the peace-making initiative of these countries manifested itself with particular strength and assumed new dimensions, scope, and effect.

In advancing toward the lofty goal of establishing a world free of nuclear weapons, a world no longer threatened by military violence, the socialist countries have unmistakably and accurately defined the basic guiding principles of their policy in relation to the other states in the following terms: **They will never start military actions unless they become the target of military aggression; they will never be the first to use nuclear weapons; they have no territorial claims as regards any other state; they do not treat any state or nation as their enemy.**

These levers of the Warsaw Pact's defense doctrine (solemnly confirmed at the 1987 meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in Berlin) found and are finding their extensive practical application in the policy conducted by the Soviet Union and all other socialist countries. Could it, otherwise, have been possible to achieve the signing of the INF Treaty, the signing of the first treaty providing real nuclear disarmament, without the readiness of the seven member states, and of the Soviet Union, in particular, of course, which acted on behalf of its allies? Naturally, this treaty was the result of an agreement between partners. However, without in the least underestimating the contribution of the United States and of its allies to the beginning of nuclear disarmament, justice requires us to stress, in the first place, the creative approach of the Soviet Union and of its allies. In overcoming outdated ideas about the necessity of a total symmetry in the disarmament process, about meticulously calculated balances of weapons, overcoming the lack of confidence in certain verification measures, including on-site inspections, **the seven socialist countries presented themselves to the world with a**

totally modern concept of reasonable sufficiency and necessary minimal defense means. The Warsaw Pact member states revealed the possibility of solutions in asymmetric proportions, contributing to the elimination of historically accumulated lack of balance in individual types of weapons. Under the influence of this approach, which also the other side should naturally take into consideration, intense negotiations are now underway on the 50-percent limitation of strategic weapons, under the condition of not admitting the militarization of outer space, and negotiations on the destruction of chemical weapons, halting nuclear arms tests, and on the limitation of conventional weapons are being conducted.

The Warsaw Pact has been and remains the reliable defense shield of socialism, capable of effectively resisting any threat, wherever it may come from. Disarmament is a method of alleviating tension and confrontation, of increasing confidence, and it represents a specific form of asserting the new political thinking. However, it is not and cannot be a one-sided, unreciprocated step toward a "farewell to arms." No one intends to give up the existing military-strategic parity, because this would be a renunciation of the guarantee that armed aggression can be stopped. While the Warsaw Pact does not need any greater security than other countries, it will never consent to accept less security. In the era of nuclear weapons, security, like the water level of connected vessels, can only be one and the same for all. **This is why, in defining disarmament as a priority task in all spheres, the Warsaw Pact is an active factor in the process of creating a system of comprehensive international security excluding a lack of balance of forces, preventing that the interests of one political system should prevail over the interests of another system.**

Not only the dynamic pace of development in the political approach of the Warsaw Pact member states to other countries is a remarkable phenomenon of recent years. The process of raising the level of cooperation within the alliance itself is very fast and efficient as well. The role of the Political Consultative Committee—the leading organ of the Warsaw Pact—as well as the role of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of the Defense Ministers' Committee was also enhanced. Prerequisites for the expansion of mutual assistance, as well as for a wider scope of coordination, and for unity of action are expanding. **The increased initiative is a strong expression of equal rights and mutual responsibility of the Warsaw Pact member states. Each of these member countries is adopting important initiatives for the consolidation of stability in its own geographical area.**

Bulgaria's creative ideas for a political, economic, and ecological cooperation in the Balkans, for the liberation of our peninsula from mass destruction weapons enjoy the full approval of our allies. This support makes our initiatives even more authoritative and important. At the same time, international and regional forums and

high level meetings are an opportunity for our country to invest all its high political prestige in support of the necessary peace initiatives adopted by the other allied states.

Thus, the Warsaw Pact more and more fully and efficiently reveals its own dual essence: to be strong and capable of resisting any aggression—and at the same time—to be able to stretch out its peaceful hand to all people for understanding and cooperation.

In the course of the passing years initial definitions and concepts of the Warsaw Pact may change, however the core of the Pact signed in Warsaw on 14 May 1955—namely its loyalty to socialism and world peace—remains unchanged and untouched by time.

BULGARIA

Charges of Soviet ABM Treaty Breaches Denied *AU1305141288 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 12 May 88 p 4*

[Article by Major General Boris Surikov: "Regarding a Case of Disinformation"]

[Text] In the West, and most of all in the United States, there have been increasingly frequent claims that the USSR has allegedly been breaching the ABM Treaty. Major General Boris Surikov, a government expert on new types and systems of mass destruction weapons, throws some light on the issue.

Recently the U.S. President declared that the development and deployment of the U.S. ABM system will be carried out so as to provide a basis for creating an all-embracing defense system for the United States. In stating this, the President made use of the argument employed in the United States that the USSR is "probably" creating a country-wide ABM system and that it possesses the only already deployed ABM system in the world, covering part of its territory.

This claim falls within the category of misleading declarations, aimed at heaping fabrications on the heads of one's opposite numbers to cleanse oneself of one's own sins. Stated more simply, it represents a variety of disinformation.

The phrase "deployed Soviet system" refers to the ABM weapons system known in the West as "Galosh" ABM-18. This system was introduced as far back as the start of the seventies for the defense of Moscow, in strict conformity with the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty.

It is no secret that research, development, and testing work is in progress in the USSR in the interests of increasing the reliability of the ABM system of the Moscow region. The modernization and replacement of components of this system are being carried out in accordance with Article 7 of the treaty. The work being

carried out in the USSR is not aimed at changing the quantitative and qualitative specifications of the system, as permitted under the treaty.

In accordance with the agreed Statement "D", the USSR is conducting research on the possibilities of utilizing systems based on new physical principles for ABM purposes, but only within the limits of the region permitted by Article 3 of the ABM Treaty, and confined to a 150-km radius. The provisions of the ABM Treaty, including Statement "D," permit testing, in a land-based version, of both ABM systems and their components (including those based on new physical principles that are already in existence or may appear in the future.)

In confirmation of the argument that the USSR allegedly possesses a deployed ABM system, the United States refers to the presence of a large number of Soviet launching installations for different types of ground-to-air missiles and the numerous radar stations distributed over the entire territory of the USSR. Modern air defense complexes—and this is well known to the specialists—are only capable of effectively shooting down piloted and pilotless aircraft. They have limited capabilities with regard to altitude of interception, average flying speed, and longitudinal and lateral overloads, [pretovarvaniya] and are not able to ensure the interception of the warheads of strategic ballistic missiles in space or at the very limit of their range of fire. Thus, the Soviet air defense missiles (in particular those referred to in the West as SA-5, SA-10, and SA-12) and all other types of missiles of this class are unsuitable for the antimissile defense of the country or of a part thereof.

As far as the traditional radar stations for air defense are concerned, these are also incapable of being used for antimissile defense. The Soviet and U.S. delegations at the SALT-I negotiations agreed on the minimum value for the potential of air defense radars. The signed statement of the leaders of the Soviet and U.S. delegations records the parties' agreement to the deployment of phased-array radars with a potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) not exceeding 3 million, apart from the cases mentioned in the ABM Treaty. All the Soviet radars have a lower potential and are incapable of detecting and tracking ballistic missiles in autonomous mode with the required accuracy.

The air defense groupings in the USSR are deployed for the defense of large industrial-administrative centers and especially important military installations. With the aim of effectively hitting aircraft and cruise missiles flying at very low, low, medium, and high altitudes, the air defense systems include both air defense missiles and interceptor fighters equipped with air-to-air missiles.

It should be emphasized that the USSR was obliged to create an expensive, dense air defense system because the land- and carrier-based aircraft of the United States are capable of making conventional and nuclear strikes

over the entire depth of Soviet territory, by utilizing the large number of military bases created by the United States around the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union rigidly adheres to all the provisions of the ABM Treaty and has no intention of sabotaging the treaty with its own hands. The success of the process that has started of eliminating nuclear missile potential depends to a large extent on fulfilling the treaty in the form in which it was signed. However, should the United States cease to observe the treaty, the first victim of this step may be the accord concerning strategic offensive missiles. Why is this so, and what connection can there be between ABM, SDI, and the strategic offensive missile agreement?

The connection is a very close one. It was recognized as long ago as at the end of the seventies, and found expression in the preamble to the ABM Treaty. If the United States, despite its treaty obligations, starts to deploy a wide-scale antimissile system, then the Soviet Union would be obliged to resort to asymmetric and economically justified measures to neutralize the threat and preserve its retaliatory strike capability. One such measure may be to examine the alternative of increasing its strategic nuclear potential in line with the increased danger.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Zapotocky Addresses UN Disarmament Commission

LD110508 Prague CTK in English
0815 GMT 3 May 88

[Text] New York May 3 (CTK correspondent)—Czechoslovak Delegate to the United Nations Evzen Zapotocky called here yesterday for additional confidence-building measures to support concrete disarmament talks.

Speaking on the first day of the regular session of the UN Disarmament Commission, the Czechoslovak delegate recalled the recent Czechoslovak proposal to create a zone of confidence and good-neighbourly relations on the line dividing the Warsaw Treaty and NATO states stressing that it is in line with this demand.

He underlined the significance of the signing of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles which is an impulse for further talks, particularly for the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit in Moscow.

Dealing with the situation in Europe, Evzen Zapotocky laid stress on the appeal to the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe approved by the Warsaw Treaty foreign ministers at their session in Sofia in March. The document covers all aspects of disarmament and security in Europe and the world he said, and voiced the conviction that the UN

Disarmament Commission will succeed in reaching agreement on the discussed issues and submitting concrete results to the 3rd special session of the UN General Assembly opening here May 31.

During its current session, the UN Disarmament Commission is to discuss and work out a comprehensive document on the removal of the threat of nuclear war, centering on questions of arms limitation control and disarmament, principles and means of strengthening confidence, and stands of individual countries and groups of states on arms budget cuts.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Response to CSSR Confidence Zone

LD1005125988 Prague CTK in English
1215 GMT 10 May 88

[Text] Prague May 10 (CTK)—Responses to the Czechoslovak proposal for the creation of a zone of confidence, cooperation and good neighbourly relations along the line dividing the Warsaw Treaty and NATO states are positive, Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry spokesman Dusan Rovensky told a news conference here today.

The proposal is fully supported by the socialist countries. A number of NATO states, neutral and nonaligned countries, political parties and movements, parliaments and institutions positively assess its complexity and peace-seeking goals. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a whole has not yet officially responded to the proposal but some of its members, for instance the USA, have appreciated the aspects of cooperation in the ecological and humanitarian spheres.

The proposal has been positively assessed by India and Mozambique as well as by the parliaments of Argentina, Syria, Switzerland and Tunisia and the Arab League. The Czechoslovak initiative was also positively assessed by the Vatican, Dusan Rovensky said.

He also dealt with the Czechoslovak stand on the third special U.N. session to be held from May 31 to June 25 and to deal with disarmament. He said Czechoslovakia regards the session as a significant event which can positively influence the disarmament process in the world. Its participants should proceed from the document adopted by the first special U.N. session on disarmament, he added and said Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek will address the session.

Dusan Rovensky questioned a recent statement by a French Foreign Ministry spokesman about the violation of human rights in Czechoslovakia and said that such statements harm the building of confidence and cooperation between nations and constitute an act of interference in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs.

Dealing with the situation in the Middle East, the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry spokesman recalled Czechoslovakia's initiative to host an unofficial conference of experts and scientists specializing in the Middle East affairs.

Committee Discusses International Security Issues
LD1305212988 Prague CTK in English
1517 GMT 13 May 88

[Text] Prague May 13 (CTK)—The Presidium of the Czechoslovak Committee for European Security and Cooperation, presided by its chairman Bohuslav Kucera, dealt with the international situation at a session here today.

The Presidium discussed the present development at the Vienna follow-up meeting of the Helsinki Conference Final Act signatories and called on all the states concerned to actively and constructively contribute to its finalization and adoption of a comprehensive and balanced final document which would create prerequisites for further development of the all-European process in all its spheres.

In view of East-West relations, of exceptional significance are questions of nuclear disarmament. Members of the Committee's Presidium therefore expect the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit between Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan to bring new impulses mainly in the sphere of nuclear disarmament.

It is in the interest of further continuation of the disarmament process that the U.S. Senate and the USSR Supreme Soviet ratify in the nearest future the treaty on the liquidation of medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles.

Czechoslovakia's contribution to its implementation is demonstrated by the fact that already before the treaty's ratification Soviet operational-tactical missiles have withdrawn from Czechoslovak territory and that the Federal Assembly approved the agreement on inspection on Czechoslovak territory which gives the United States the possibility to verify the treaty's implementation for 13 years.

The Presidium discussed the committee's activity in the previous period and prospects for the future. It appreciated the fact that the International Committee for European Security and Cooperation accepted with understanding the Czechoslovak initiative to create a zone of confidence, cooperation and good neighbourly relations on the line dividing the NATO and Warsaw Treaty member states presented by Czechoslovak Communist Party General Secretary Milos Jakes, and that it decided to include this proposal in the agenda of an international forum on questions of European security and cooperation due to be held in Belgium at the end of September.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND Condemns FRG Weapons Development

LD0705102188 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 0119 GMT 7 May 88

[Text] Berlin, 7 May (ADN)—“In the FRG, the green light is on for the most expensive arms project so far,” NEUES DEUTSCHLAND writes in a commentary on Saturday. “That is, for the development and production of the ‘Jaeger-Hunter 90,’ and thus for the squandering of billions which could be put to better use to eliminate unemployment.”

The project was justified by the “‘threatening situation in Europe,’ and by the apparently superior ‘attack capacity of the Warsaw Pact.’”

Federal Defense Minister Woerner “is deliberately lying. There is no increasing threat from the Warsaw Pact. Rather, the opposite: at Waren, an FDGB holiday home is coming into being where nuclear missiles were once deployed—they have been withdrawn ahead of schedule in accordance with the agreement on medium-range missiles between the USSR and the United States. And the Warsaw Pact offered NATO other zero solutions and radical reductions in other types of weapons, too, at their Berlin summit a year ago.

“On the agenda is the proposal of socialism to liberate our world from all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000. This corresponds to the vital interests of people, particularly in the two German states, who wish that war never again emanates from German soil. Does Bonn want to make people believe that peace can be created with the ‘Jaeger-Hunter 90’ and more and more new weapons? And finally: How many new jobs could be created with the DM 50 billion?”

USSR Defense Minister Speaks on Visit to GDR

Soviet Defense Minister's Speech

AU1605203788 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 12 May 88 pp 3, 4

[Speech by Army General Dmitriy Yazov, USSR defense minister and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, at a meeting of friendship and comradeship-in-arms at the Rudolf Renner Regiment of the Heinz Hoffmann Division in Neubrandenburg Bezirk on 11 May: “The Friendship Among Our Soldiers Is Firm and Indestructible”]

[Excerpt]

Constructive Approach to Urgent Issues of Mankind

Throughout the world the understanding is deepening that socialism and peace belong indivisibly together. All this is taking place despite attempts by imperialist reactionary circles to preserve the stereotyped phrases of the "Cold War" in international politics and to intimidate the Western public through the "hostile image" created by bourgeois propaganda and the alleged threat that emanates from the USSR and the Warsaw Pact.

But as is well known, lies have short wings. And they become even shorter through the sincerity of our activities in the international arena, through our constructive, balanced, and responsible approach to the tasks that are of primary importance for the whole of mankind.

Primarily it is a task of preventing war and preserving peace.

The Soviet Union, the GDR, and our fraternal parties led by Erich Honecker and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev are fighting actively to solve this task. Our joint actions are directed toward safeguarding a lasting peace, and creation of a common European house, a house founded on respect for the social decision of the peoples and the unshakability of existing political realities.

In the current phase of development, the new political thinking that was proclaimed by our party has become a strong instrument in safeguarding and strengthening peace. Its main message is that a nuclear war, which would immediately extinguish all life, cannot be used to solve political conflicts. And at the current stage of military development, a conventional war between the superpowers can also be compared with a nuclear war in terms of the fatal consequences.

Today Security Means Equal Security for All States

From this results the objective and imperative necessity to renounce war and violence in thinking and acting in world politics. The realities in the nuclear-space age are such that security can only exist in the same measure and for all states together. Security cannot be guaranteed by "deterrence" to which many politicians and strategists in the West are very attached. Security can also not be achieved by the arms race which the aggressive circles of imperialism want to extend to into space.

The Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist states are countering the attempts of the reaction with a firm, constructive, and coordinated line of detente.

This also finds precise expression in the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states, which has an expressly defensive nature. It is remarkable that this doctrine was passed a year ago at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Berlin, in the city

where World War II ended and from which now the call by the countries of the socialist community of states for practical actions for the prevention of war is sounded.

Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine: Prevention of War

A visible example of how, with the presence of political will, even the most complicated issues can be solved is the signing of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. As you know, we have removed our shorter-range missiles from your republic and the CSSR ahead of schedule. These missiles were intended for scrapping in accordance with the treaty. This is an important practical step along the path of strengthening confidence and security in Europe. The agreement proposed by the fraternal socialist states between the organizations of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on a radical reduction of forces and arms in Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals—would serve the same end.

In accordance with the Geneva agreement on Afghanistan, in a few days the Soviet Union will start the withdrawal of its contingent of troops from this friendly country. This is a tangible confirmation of the possibility of political settlement of regional conflicts which today render the situation explosive in various areas of the globe.

The advancement of the process of disarmament, of the process of the creation of a world without nuclear weapons did not, however, take place without difficulties. The situation in Europe and the world as a whole continues to be complicated and contradictory. The United States and some of its NATO partners are continuing by their behavior in the world arena the dangerous course of the policy of strength. The reactionary circles in the West basically reject the principle of the balance of interests of all sides and strive for superiority over the Warsaw Pact. Currently NATO staffs are making plans to "compensate" for the Pershing-2 and land-based cruise missiles, which are to be scrapped under the INF Treaty, by an arms buildup in other spheres as well as by modernizing nuclear arsenals.

All this creates the need for us to constantly guarantee the high combat readiness of the fraternal armies and to strengthen the defense capability of the socialist community of states. It must be of such a level that no one can surprise us. From this results the need for every officer and soldier to persistently perfect his military skills and to strengthen organization and discipline.

The formation and training of the socialist countries' armed forces and their activities are to be carried out in strict accordance with the principles of the Warsaw Pact's military doctrine. It reflects the joint military-political goals aimed at defense and the common features of the national military doctrines of the individual Warsaw Pact member states, and is fully designed to prevent war.

The military alliance of the armies of the Warsaw Pact states is firm and indestructible. The Soviet Armed Forces and the GDR National People's Army represent important parts of the alliance. From year to year our relations and contacts become deeper, broader, and more fruitful. They embrace all areas of the life and activity of the allied armies, from technical equipment to political education work. Joint exercises and maneuvers play an important role in perfecting cooperation. Your regiment has been active within the division in a series of them, including the comradeship-in-arms maneuvers.

We learn together, live together, and strengthen the defense of our community together. In practice, this is what we jointly and proudly call "comradeship-in-arms." It is our duty, the duty of patriots and internationalists, to protect and consolidate this comradeship-in-arms. We are pleased about the comradely relations that link the members of the GDR National People's Army and the Group of Soviet Forces in the GDR. Side by side they ensure the protection of the socialist community of states in this important phase. The internationalist friendship among soldiers makes this bulwark insuperable.

Reliably and Jointly We Protect the Socialist Community of States

This has again been confirmed during our stay with your regiment. We have no doubt that you, as well as all members of the GDR National People's Army, together with the other fraternal armies, will continue to do everything possible to reliably protect the revolutionary achievements and the peaceful work of the people of the GDR, as well as the security of the entire community of socialist states.

GDR Defense Minister's Speech

*AU1605101888 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 12 May 88 p 3, 4*

[Speech by GDR Defense Minister Army General Heinz Kessler at a meeting of friendship and comradeship-in-arms in the Rudolf Renner Regiment of the Heinz Hoffmann Division in East Berlin on 11 May: "We Intensify the Struggle To Safeguard Peace With Great Vigilance"]

[Excerpts] Dear Comrades:

Today we welcome very cordially the official USSR military delegation headed by Comrade Army General Dmitriy Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR defense minister, here in the Rudolf Renner Motorized Infantry Regiment!

Comrade Erich Honecker recently called the year 1988 a "decisive year ... from various points of view." Indeed, events of historical importance are taking place in these days, and new ones will mature.

The basically new approach of the Soviet Union and our community of socialist states to the extremely important processes of arms limitation, disarmament, and the safeguarding of international security in the nuclear-space age has already led to first successes.

As you, esteemed Comrade Minister Yazov, pointed out a few days ago, the fact alone that the intermediate-range missile treaty with the United States was signed proves that the prospects for a world free of nuclear weapons and threats of destruction are gaining shape.

To Free the People From the Danger of a Nuclear Inferno

How serious we are in our efforts to free the people as far and as quickly as possible from the danger of a nuclear inferno and the oppressive burden of increasingly costly armaments, and to use the resources saved in this way to improve the lives of the working people in town and countryside, is something we all experienced only a few weeks ago when the Soviet operational-tactical missiles were withdrawn prematurely from their base in Waren.

Meanwhile, as you know, the destruction of these missiles has begun. Their transport vehicles are being converted into mobile cranes, and the former accommodation buildings are being converted into an FDGB vacation home.

The same consistency with which the Soviet Union and the GDR began the implementation of the Soviet-U.S. intermediate-range missiles treaty even before its ratification will continue after it comes into force: It will be implemented point for point, without any ifs and buts, and our state will fulfill with great circumspection and care its obligations under the agreement.

As is well known, in the NATO area things are not yet so explicit. Therefore, when asked by journalists whether consideration is being given to using the missile sites in Mutlangen or Wueschheim for peaceful purposes, similar to what is being done in the GDR, the FRG Defense Ministry in Bonn said that military "follow-up use" of these objects is indispensable.

Already since the beginning of the year the NATO bodies have been examining the most varied armaments programs to "compensate" for the dismantling of the U.S. ground-based intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe and to maintain possibilities for strategic influence deep into the hinterland of the Warsaw Pact.

This does not surprise us at all. After all, we know the military forces in the NATO staffs, who "do not like the entire development." But these actions, which are totally contrary to the spirit and letter of the Soviet-U.S. treaty and, in particular, to the vital interests of the people, admonish us to stay vigilant and to intensify our efforts in the struggle to safeguard peace.

The supporters of the nuclear "deterrence" strategy in NATO continue to have considerable influence. Yes, ignoring the will of the masses, they still have a decisive influence on the military thinking and the specific military actions in NATO.

"Modernization is under way," said the U.S. secretary of defense a few days ago and listed the following things, and, I quote: "At present we are renewing our nuclear combat planes and our nuclear artillery. Together with the British, we plan an aircraft missile that is capable of hitting ground targets at longer distances. The decision that there must be a replacement for the Lance missiles has long ago been made." This was said by Mr Caspar Weinberger's successor.

NATO Strategy Still Aimed at Superiority

And in the West European NATO area "modernization is under way" too, as they call it. In the FRG Bundeswehr, too, the direction is toward an improvement in attack capability, toward more and increasingly more accurate means for sudden strikes at targets in the entire area of our defense.

Dear comrades, as long as the aim of military strategy, of equipment, and training of the main NATO powers is "deterrence" and military superiority, our defense alliance must and will counter the NATO armies with such forces and means as are sufficient not to give rise to speculations of revisionist circles about a surprise attack and to prevent them from dangerous adventures.

The decisive criterion for that which is described in our military doctrine as "adequate defense capacity" or "reasonable sufficiency":

- is and remains our clear determination to give reliable military protection under all circumstances to peace and socialism;

- is and remains the masterly control of weapons and all other technical combat means visible to everyone.

It is the main function of the socialist armed forces and of each of its members—no matter whether he does his duty as a soldier or noncommissioned officer, as a warrant officer, officer, or general, in uniform or in civilian clothes—to guarantee this under any conditions in the struggle to safeguard peace.

I think that today and tomorrow our Soviet guests will be able to convince themselves clearly that this internal connection, this interrelation between the successful, peace-loving foreign policy of the socialist community and its defense readiness, its defense capability, is correctly understood by the members of the National People's Army, and also by the members of the Heinz

Hoffmann Tank Division and its Rudolf Renner Motorized Infantry Regiment, and expresses itself in corresponding military performance.

Comradeship-in-Arms Practiced in Life

I would like to take this opportunity to assure Comrade Army General Yazov, USSR defense minister, and his entourage that the members of the National People's Army of the GDR will continue to do their utmost to strengthen socialism and secure a constantly high combat readiness, and to consolidate the steadfast comradeship-in-arms with the Soviet Army in the defense of peace and the achievements of our allied people here in the heart of Europe!

Nier Discusses Security Issues with Italian Foreign Minister

LD1605195688 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1457 GMT 16 May 88

[Text] Rome, 16 May (ADN)—GDR Deputy Foreign Minister Kurt Nier and Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti acknowledged the good state of bilateral relations at a meeting in Rome today. They spoke favorably of further developing the political dialogue and cooperation between the GDR and Italy in all spheres. In this way, the two countries could contribute to consolidating stability and trust in Europe.

Kurt Nier and Giulio Andreotti expressed their hope that the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles would be ratified before the summit meeting of Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. The agreement opened up for the first time the chance to make disarmament permanent and irreversible. Now it is a matter of purposefully continuing the progress. The main item on the agenda here was the halving of the arsenals of strategic offensive weapons, with observation of the ABM Treaty, a ban on chemical weapons, and conventional disarmament measures.

Both politicians expressed the hope that important stimuli for this would come from the forthcoming meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan.

In this connection, Kurt Nier explained the GDR's initiatives for creating nuclear and chemical weapon-free zones in central Europe. He noted the worldwide response to the convening of an international meeting for nuclear weapon-free zones in Berlin in June.

Both politicians spoke favorably of the early conclusion of the Vienna CSCE review meeting with a substantive and balanced final document.

Kurt Nier is in Rome for consultations at the invitation of Enzo Perlot, general director for political affairs in the Italian Foreign Ministry.

Computer Reliance Increases Nuclear War Risk Factors

18160004w Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 12, Dec 87 (signed to press 17 Nov 87) pp 3-11

[Article by L. Tolkunov: "Nuclear Disarmament—Command of the Times"]

[Text] According to a scientific theory, the universe originated as the result of a "big bang." Now, however, an artificial "big bang"—owing to ill intent or a fatal mistake—could turn into a radioactive wilderness the Earth—the pearl of the universe. The threat is great. It is a question of the survival of mankind. It bears the responsibility for self-preservation and the preservation of life on the planet. "The present generations..." M.S. Gorbachev's report at the ceremonial session commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Great October emphasizes, "are responsible for the fate of civilization and life on Earth itself. It depends on them ultimately whether the start of the new millennium of world history is its tragic epilogue or inspirational prologue to the future."

Of course, a special, heightened, unique, it may be said, responsibility to the entire human community for the fate of the world and its assured survival is borne by the Soviet Union and the United States—the two mightiest powers with vast interests and tremendous material and intellectual potential which concentrate, what is more, the overwhelming mass of nuclear weapons. And we are entirely justified in posing the question thus: these states—despite the fact that literally heaps of problems have accumulated between them—must have sufficient wisdom, ability, responsibility and respectfulness toward one another in order to understand today's world and prevent a catastrophe. This is expected of them by people of the Earth, particularly on the threshold of the meeting of Soviet and American leaders which begins on 7 December in Washington.

Pondering what needs to be done for an improvement in Soviet-American relations, M.S. Gorbachev writes in his book "Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and the World" of the need for lessons to be learned from the past, from the past of Soviet-American relations included, in order, first, to understand the reasons for what has happened and, second, to think about how we should live in the future in this world and how cooperate. "This," he emphasizes, "is a science, a serious science, a responsible science, if, of course, we hold to positions of truth" (p 221). It is perfectly obvious that more harmonious relations between the USSR and the United States cannot be approached if we remain in the grip of ideological myths. And it is not only a question of the tenacity of such myths, settled cliches of political thinking (paramount among which are the stereotypes of anti-Sovietism, the "Soviet threat" and the "enemy image") and traditional ideas concerning power and strength as the most dependable guarantee of peace. It is

a question also of the existence of the actual interests of those who have, as they say, bound themselves fast to military business. It is a question of the activity of circles and forces united in M.S. Gorbachev's book in the concept of the "militarist party in the United States," which is "allergic to even the slightest easing of relations between our countries" (p 250). And if abrupt changes have occurred in Soviet-American relations since the war—from alliance during WWII to the "cold war" of the 1940's-1950's and from the detente of the 1970's to the sharp exacerbation on the frontier of the 1980's—this has largely been explained by the fact that the interests of the militarist grouping have in one way or another gained the ascendancy, as has happened repeatedly.

The brief excursion into history offered here is made not for the now fruitless elucidation of the questions: who is to blame or who is the more to blame but for the sake of an understanding of what has brought the world to the present critical phase, to the danger of nuclear apocalypse.

I

The defenders of militarism maintain that strength is a guarantee of peace. According to their logic, nuclear weapons preclude the use of weapons altogether and thereby serve peace. The past 40 peaceful years are cited in confirmation. Thus are attempts made to substantiate the effectiveness of the "nuclear restraint" or "deterrence" doctrine.

According to M. Halperin, director of the Center for National Security Studies and well-known American specialist in the arms control field, the United States' military doctrine has for several decades been based on an extremely erroneous and dangerous assumption concerning the possibility of fighting a nuclear war and winning it. According to him, operational nuclear devices of any type are not weapons in the conventional understanding of this word. They cannot be a means for either combatant of conducting combat operations and of winning. In the event of the use of such weapons, destruction would threaten not only the enemy but also the attacking side and all terrestrial civilization too. There would be no winner in such a war. However, the author concludes, despite the sufficiently obvious nature of this finding, the U.S. military and political leadership is elaborating strategic plans based on the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons; a vast military machinery of annihilation, which could get out of control, has been created.

It is sufficient merely to enumerate the American military doctrines and strategic concepts of the postwar period to persuade oneself that the power approach has been a constant dominant in Washington's ideas concerning "national security."

While the ruins of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were still exuding lethal radiation, the strategy of "massive retaliation" was adopted. It was based on the United States' nuclear monopoly and the feeling of impunity and permissiveness ensuing from a belief in the total invulnerability of the North American continent. However, its bankruptcy was shortly revealed. The American nuclear monopoly was broken. Appreciable adjustments to the calculations of the U.S. military and political leadership were made by the launching in 1957 of the first Soviet artificial Earth satellite. It was apparent to even the most obtuse in Washington that, in the event of a conflict, the United States would be subject to a palpable retaliatory attack. The "flexible response" strategy appeared at the start of the 1960's. It could not have failed to have taken into consideration the approximate balance between the USSR and the United States in strategic arsenals—the "nuclear stalemate" which had arisen. The new strategy permitted a "measured" use of military force commensurate with the "scale of the present danger." The "measure" itself envisaged the preparation and fighting of all wars—world or local, nuclear or conventional, large or small. This meant that the "massive retaliation" strategy had not been cast aside, as was stated, but had become an organic part of the "flexible response" strategy which had come to replace it.

In our time the military doctrine of the United States is being reconsidered once again. The present strategy of "direct confrontation" between the USSR and the United States provides on a global and regional scale for the implementation of wide-ranging programs of the modernization of the strategic offensive forces and general forces and the development of new types of weapons. Particular hopes are linked with the use of the latest S&T achievements and technological potential of the United States and the whole of the West for the purpose of the creation of new areas of military rivalry.

The military-political designs and strategic principles of the United States have in the past 40 years been specified in a whole succession of Pentagon plans. (M. Kaku) and D. Axelrod, the authors of the book "Winning a Nuclear War: the Pentagon's Secret Military Plans," which was published in 1987, write: "An close reading of the papers shows that, contrary to public statements concerning 'deterrence' and 'defense,' the real nuclear policy of America's military department has provided for the use of nuclear arms to threaten nuclear war, fight a nuclear war, survive in a nuclear war and even 'win' a nuclear war." This idea has been embodied in various concepts: under Truman it was called "atomic diplomacy," under Eisenhower-Dulles, "brinkmanship," under McNamara, "controlled escalation and "flexible response," and under Nixon, "limited nuclear options"; the formula "fighting a nuclear war," which assumes that such a war can indeed be fought and won, became current under Carter. The book sets forth the history of the inception of the "domination at all levels of conflict" principle, which forms the basis of all postwar American military doctrines.

As of the present time the United States has more than 1,500 military bases and facilities in 32 countries and maintains more than half a million servicemen overseas. As a report distributed by the White House on 28 January 1987 observes, U.S. security strategy, its global aims and the very nature of the threat require that "we be ready to defend our interests at the remotest frontiers from the North America. In accordance with this, our strategy relies to a considerable extent on the principle of the forward basing of forces in a state of readiness based on strong alliances. To maintain these relations we will continue to preserve in peacetime at the forward boundaries large army, naval and air forces in Europe and in the Atlantic and the Pacific and also other forces in the Western hemisphere and Indian Ocean."

As we can see, in elaborating its strategic concepts the Pentagon succumbs to the disastrous delusion that national security can be strengthened thanks to the buildup and creation of new weapons systems. Hopes are placed in an upgrading of military technology. The dangerous philosophy of "nuclear deterrence" is preserved, as before.

Many West European politicians also maintain that the idea of a nuclear-free world is utopian and that nuclear weapons are a deterrent factor. This idea permeates the speeches of M. Thatcher, J. Chirac and H. Kohl. There are also, of course, people who sincerely believe that the nuclear evil is necessary for preventing a greater evil—war.

But surely it is obvious that the "nuclear safe-conduct" is not trouble-free and not indefinite? The more the quantity of nuclear weapons, the fewer the possibilities of their "obedient behavior." Essentially, in the last decade the creation of increasingly new and more sophisticated means of warfare has increased the likelihood of an exterminating conflict.

A whole number of new, hitherto unknown "risk factors" has appeared. The threat of an accidental, unpremeditated nuclear catastrophe has grown primarily. Such a danger is increased noticeably by the "time factor," when decisions have to be made in a matter of minutes and seconds. And in this case it is necessary to call for assistance on complex computer devices, that is, to transfer intelligent political decisions to the trust of robots, which, of course, cannot be absolutely perfect and reliable. Even the latest apparatus does not preclude the possibility of a tragic mishap, miscalculation or error.

The threat is recognized by sober-minded people in the United States itself also. Thus J. Douglas, former U.S. assistant attorney general, wrote in the NEW YORK TIMES: "We are approaching the very edge of the abyss. But it should be recalled that in the past each newly chosen type of weapon was, with the rare exception, used. Clearly, the risk of a nuclear conflict is increasing. Technical progress and the strategic directions of

national policy increase the possibility of fatal miscalculations. The time for adopting retaliatory measures has been reduced, nuclear weapons have been taken onto the battlefield and first-strike capacity has increased. Meanwhile technical progress continues to undermine the capacity for rational decision-making in periods of crises in relations between the superpowers."

The well-known American historian and diplomat G. Kennan wrote in the spring issue of the journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS for 1987: "It is perfectly clear to me that the Soviet leaders do not want war with us and are not about to start a war. Specifically, I never believed that they considered the military seizure of West Europe as being in their interests or that they might in general attack this region, even if the so-called deterrent nuclear forces did not exist.... I believe that the arms race in which we are now both participating represents a serious threat in itself not on account of the aggressive intentions of one side but on account of the fact that we have at times to act by force of necessity and also on account of the suspicions and anxieties engendered by such competition and on account of the highly serious dangers of the unpremeditated complications which it entails—computer errors and failures, wrongly understood signals or damage caused deliberately by third parties."

II

It was the so-called "deterrence" philosophy gave birth to R. Reagan's "strategic defense initiative." But in reality it was needed—and this is becoming increasingly apparent—not for "detering" a nonexistent aggressor and defense of the United States against a mythical threat but for implementation of imperial policy, which has been stalemated under the conditions of strategic parity and which it is desired to extricate therefrom with the aid of space-based experiments. Is this not indicated, for example, by the arguments of Z. Brzezinski, former national security adviser to the U.S. President, in his book "Game Plan," which was published in 1986? The essence of the concept which he expounds is thus. Military control of space is becoming a powerful lever of compulsion to geopolitical obedience on Earth. Given the tremendous power of destruction of nuclear weapons, which could be aimed at ground targets, undivided superiority in space could be of greater significance than was ever the case with domination at sea. Not submitting to the political demands of the power possessing indisputable superiority in space would mean bringing about destruction for one's country, it lacking the weapons necessary for a retaliatory strike. Z. Brzezinski concludes from what has been said the following: rivalry in space is unfolding for the sake of acquisition of strategic means of pressure.

At the time of formulation of the ABM Treaty the USSR and the United States adhered to the common viewpoint that broad-based ABM defenses would destabilize the situation and increase the threat of the outbreak of war. They could be effective only against the retaliatory strike

of weakened nuclear forces of a country which had been subjected to nuclear attack. For this reason a space shield is needed by those who are preparing first activation of the space sword. Even if "star wars" can never function as an effective defense system, (M. Kaku) and D. Axelrod, the authors of the above-mentioned book "Winning a Nuclear War: the Pentagon's Secret Plans" observe, it has another sphere of application, in which even a partial, "pierced" shield has colossal military potential. If a country had such a shield, it could deliver a first strike, wipe out vast numbers of the enemy's ground missiles and then avail itself of it to absorb the weakened retaliatory strike.

The Pentagon allows of the possibility of a breach of the American ABM system by hundreds and even thousands of warheads of unprecedented power of destruction. Emphasis is now being put on the protection with the aid of ABM defenses of the American command centers, nuclear weapons dumps, missile silos, nuclear reactors and so forth.

In December 1986, the U.S. President put forward a new version of the "star wars" program providing for the deployment of the "first echelon" of broad-based ABM defenses in 1994 even. The purpose of the project is to speed up the transition from research in the field of broad-based ABM defense to the practical deployment of space-based systems. The plan provides for putting into orbit dozens of spacecraft carrying small missiles for destroying missile warheads in flight and creating a satellite system of reconnaissance and observation. The ABM defenses will also include hundreds of ground-based missiles. The proposed system is intended for the protection of a limited number of military facilities.

Having adopted a policy of the achievement of military superiority by way of realization of the "star wars" program, Washington is attempting to involve the Soviet Union in costly space projects of a military nature. American specialists have calculated that the creation of ABM defenses could cost four-five times more than the creation by the other side of missiles capable of overcoming it. Clearly referring to the economic consequences of an arms race in space for the Soviet Union, E. Teller, "father" of the American hydrogen bomb, maintained that if the USSR follows the U.S. example and starts the creation of its own broad-based ABM defense in space, "the SDI may be considered justified."

The Soviet attitude toward the SDI is well known to the international community. First, this program is clearly linked with the United States' hopes of surging toward military superiority and outflanking the Soviet Union. Second, the SDI means the transference of weapons to a new environment—space—which will destabilize the strategic situation sharply. Third, mere adherence to this program testifies to a political goal—putting the USSR by hook or by crook in an unequal position and at the same time exhausting it economically, involving it in a new twist of the arms race spiral. We have warned the

United States in good time that if it succeeds in accomplishing its intentions in respect of the SDI, although this we strongly doubt, a Soviet response will follow. The response will be effective, reliable and economical. We have a study of how to devalue the SDI without spending on this the fabulous amounts which the United States will need to build it.

But this is not our choice. We want and are seeking a different solution. Disarmament is, as history has shown, an extraordinarily difficult problem. It is made even more difficult by the presence and development of nuclear weapons and the use in the process of the arms race of the latest achievements of science and technology. Nonetheless, we may be sure that mankind is capable of stepping back from the nuclear abyss and finding fundamentally new forms of ensuring security on Earth.

It took millions of years for intelligent life to originate on our planet. But today, in the nuclear and space age, it runs the risk of instantaneous annihilation. Such a monstrous prospect cannot be accepted. Scientists have yet to prove the existence of intelligent life on other planets of our system and throughout the universe even. And what could be a loftier and nobler goal than salvation of humankind!

The creation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons has brought the world to the point of no return. Attention was called to the pivotal nature of the historic moment through which we are living by M.S. Gorbachev in his speech at the international forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Mankind," emphasizing that the creation and, subsequently, the stockpiling of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems beyond all reasonable limits had rendered man technically capable of putting an end to his own existence. Simultaneously the buildup in the world of explosive social material and attempts to continue to solve problems of a cardinally changed world by force and methods inherited from the Stone Age are making a catastrophe highly likely politically also. Militarization of thinking and lifestyle weakens or removes altogether even the moral impediments en route to nuclear suicide.

In a word, the question is: either political thinking will come into line with the demands of the times or civilization and life on Earth itself could disappear. Mankind has no other choice. Yes, the ideological argument is irrevocable. But nuclear realities dictate the need for new thinking and a new philosophy of international relations. Security today is not determined by the number of missiles, submarines or aircraft. War and the use of force cannot be a prudent and acceptable instrument of policy. All peoples are like the climbers' rope on the mountain side. They can either climb further, toward the summit, together or fall into the chasm together.

This is not only a political and military but also moral question. A sign of a new approach to problems of the modern highly complex and contradictory world should be the humanitarian breadth of thinking of statesmen and politicians. They need no less breadth now than political calculation, diplomatic circumspection and parliamentary skill. Life emphatically demands that they, finally, move beyond the framework of narrowly conceived state interests and ascend to the level of a general approach to problems of the times. It is thus a question of statesmen's responsibility not only for the peaceful life and well-being of their own people but also for the security and prosperity of all mankind for genuine national interests are today essentially the interests of the entire human race. This is why at the end of the 20th century there should be no mistrust, hostility, alienation and enmity in relations between peoples. Ideological intolerance in order to alienate countries must not be cultivated. We have taken the necessary steps in our policy to rid it of ideological prejudice. And the West needs to do this too. It is necessary to look ahead and see the reference points toward which all peoples can and must proceed in concert.

The time has come to establish sounder relations between all states of East and West. While remaining themselves in their systems and their alliances, they could play a positive part in world development and contribute to the stabilization of the international situation.

III

The foreign policy program of the 27th CPSU Congress is a striking and indisputable embodiment of Lenin's evaluation of disarmament as the ideal of socialism. A policy based on force is today futile and dangerous. While not denying the need for sufficient defense capability, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are bringing to the fore political means of solving international problems. The task is not to stockpile new heaps of weapons but to seek accords and agreements between the USSR and the United States and the Warsaw Pact and NATO on arms reductions and confidence-building measures and to elaborate and activate mechanisms providing for general international security. Even military-strategic parity, which is today the foundation of peace, cannot perform this function forever. The balance of terror is not only amoral but also unreliable.

In lowering the parity level it is essential to move toward the main reference point—the gradual, complete elimination of nuclear weapons and other means of mass extermination on Earth. Stability in the world must be maintained not by force of weapons but with the aid of political and legal means.

Recognizing what a formidable threat nuclear weapons represent for mankind, the Soviet Union has since the very moment of their appearance advocated the banning and destruction thereof. At one of the first meetings of

the UN Atomic Energy Commission on 19 June 1946 the USSR put forward a draft international convention banning the production, use and storage of weapons based on the use of atomic energy for purposes of mass annihilation. The USSR proposed that all subscribers to such a convention solemnly undertake under no circumstances to use atomic weapons, to ban their production and storage and to destroy within a period of 3 months all stockpiles of available weapons and those in production. It never occurred to the United States, which had a nuclear monopoly, at that time to renounce this means of blackmail and pressure.

In subsequent years the USSR continued persistently to advocate a ban on nuclear means of annihilation. In the first half of the 1950's our country repeatedly proposed the announcement of an unconditional ban on atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapon of mass destruction. Importance is attached to the resolution "On the Nonuse of Force in International Relations and the Prohibition Forever of the Use of Nuclear Weapons," which was passed on the initiative of the Soviet Union at the UN General Assembly session in 1972. Thanks to the persistent efforts of our country, the United Nations adopted in 1981, the declaration "Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe," which contains the declaration that states and statesmen who are the first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons will be committing the most heinous crime against humanity.

Subsequently the USSR has continued persevering struggle for the limitation, prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. In parallel, as the threat of the militarization of near-Earth space has become increasingly distinct, it has increased its efforts for the purpose of barring the way of weapons into space.

The flight of Yuriy Gagarin on 12 April 1961 was an important frontier in the development of human civilization. People of the whole world had won a most signal victory over the forces of nature. How far the world has advanced since that historic day in the study and rendering habitable of space! This process promises tremendous benefits. Today even space equipment is being employed extensively for terrestrial needs. The time for the accomplishment of the principal task of cosmonautics—the industrialization of near-Earth space and the creation of orbital factories and plants, which will produce, under conditions of high vacuum and weightlessness, fundamentally new products—is nigh. Space must serve people.

From the very start of the space era the Soviet Union has resolutely opposed plans for the militarization of near-Earth space. Back in 1958, the Soviet Government proposed that the UN General Assembly study the question of a ban on the use of outer space for military purposes. The Treaty on the Principles of the Activity of

States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, was drawn up on the initiative of the USSR and came into force in 1967.

In 1976, the USSR submitted to the United Nations a proposal on the conclusion of a universal treaty on the nonuse of force in international relations. The draft document incorporated a proposition concerning renunciation of the use of armed forces using all types of weapons, including nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, on land, at sea, in the air and in outer space. The Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of a treaty banning the deployment in outer space of weapons of any kind and submitted to the United Nations in 1981 the draft of such a treaty. In 1983, the USSR proposed that a total ban be sought on the use of military force both in outer space and from space in respect of the Earth.

In 1984, the Soviet Union proposed to the United States a start on negotiations on the question of prevention of the militarization of near-Earth space and the renunciation of assault space-based weapons, including ASAT weapons and ABM interceptors of all types of basing. In the fall of the same year the USSR submitted to the United Nations a proposal on the use of outer space solely for peaceful purposes, for the good of mankind. The General Assembly voted in favor of a draft resolution on prevention of an arms race in outer space and demanded that its conquest be undertaken solely without the use or threat of force. In August 1985 the USSR proposed for study by the United Nations the question "International Cooperation in the Peaceful Conquest of Outer Space Under Conditions of its Nonmilitarization."

As of the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum, the USSR's foreign policy has risen to a qualitatively new level of dynamism and constructiveness. How we conceive of movement toward a secure, lasting peace has been clearly stated. Our country has presented a whole program of bold, multilateral, large-scale disarmament measures. An all-embracing, substantiated, realistic plan for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and other means of mass annihilation on Earth was offered for the judgment of mankind for the first time in the historic statement of 15 January 1986.

The philosophy of the Soviet concept of peace is not simply one of rejection of nuclear terror or brinkmanship. It is a philosophy of life, a philosophy of action. It is developing together with the course of objective processes in the world.

When elaborating on the basis of new thinking the prospects of advancement toward a stable, nuclear-free world, Soviet political thought substantiated the need for and possibility of an all-embracing system of international security under conditions of disarmament.

Particular mention has to be made in this connection of relations between the USSR and the United States. Despite the fact that they remain complex, difficult and contradictory, an intensive political dialogue is being conducted between the two countries at the present time. Much has changed in them for the better since the top-level meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik. Life has confirmed the soundness of the proposition that an important intellectual breakthrough in most important areas of current world politics was made in Reykjavik. This meeting imparted practical energy to the new thinking and permitted it take hold in the most diverse social and political circles and made international political contacts more fruitful.

The merit of Reykjavik was that it initiated a process which led to understandings on the third and fourth Soviet-American summits—in Washington and Moscow—definition of the concept of the meetings and the elaboration of their agenda.

At the meeting in the United States an agreement will be signed on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles. An entire class of nuclear arms will thereby have been eliminated and the first actual step en route to the removal of nuclear arsenals will have been taken.

But time does not wait. The danger of an upgrading of weapons, which could get out of control, continues to increase. This is why the Soviet leadership has declared with all certainty that it will strive persistently at the upcoming summit meetings for a perceptible improvement and specific results in the key question of removal of the nuclear threat—that of a reduction in strategic offensive weapons and the prevention of weapons being put into space.

It is true, of course, that if we measure what has been achieved against the scale of the tasks which have to be tackled to ensure mankind's survival, little has yet been done. An aspiration to social revanche is nurturing a variety of the militarist programs of the West. A lack of responsibility and new thinking is still perceived in the policy of Western states. An understanding that outside of the new thinking policy becomes an unpredictable improvisation, contains risk factors and has no long-term basis has not taken root. However, and this is the main thing, a start has been made, and the first signs of changes can be seen.

L.N. Tolstoy said that ideas which have tremendous consequences are always simple. The idea of the deliverance of mankind from the burden of nuclear arms and weapons in general is essentially simple also. Its realization would have immeasurable salutary consequences for all peoples. A generator of tension, mistrust and hostility on Earth would be removed, and it would be

possible to remove for all time the threat of the destruction of everything living, not to mention the fact that this would make it possible, finally, to embark in earnest on the solution of the greatest global problems which have confronted mankind.

It is today, it was emphasized at the gala festivities in Moscow, that the foundations of the future are being laid, and it is our duty to preserve our inimitable civilization and life on Earth itself, strive for the triumph of reason over nuclear insanity and create all the conditions for the free and all-around development of man and mankind.

The Soviet Union is demonstrating the political will and manifesting a firm resolve to have done with the threat of a world thermonuclear war. The right to live under conditions of peace and freedom is man's main right, for the sake of the defense of which it is worth living, working and fighting.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya," 1987

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C³I as Factor of Strategic Stability
*18160004x Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 12, Dec 87 (signed to press 17 Nov 87) pp 12-23*

[Article by A. Arbatov and A. Savelyev: "The Control and Communications System as a Factor of Strategic Stability"]

[Text] In studies devoted to problems of strategic stability, parity, and balance of forces strategic offensive and defensive arms systems—ICBM's, SLBM's, heavy bombers, and ABM systems—and their quantitative and qualitative specifications figure at the forefront, as a rule. The calculations and comparisons made in this connection are graphic and physically perceptible. At the same time a very important, if not key, question in study of the said problems is estimation of the state of the strategic forces' operational control and communications system (CCS).^{***} In recent years this subject matter has been illustrated increasingly in studies conducted in the arms limitation field. The advancement by the Reagan administration in 1981 of a program for the modernization of strategic arms, in which questions of an upgrading of the CCS play a principal part, has contributed to this to a large extent.

The increased attention to the CCS is explained by a whole number of factors. One has been brought about by the requirements of ensuring "nuclear deterrence," which is based on the principle according to which in the event of a hypothetical enemy launching a first strike a retaliatory strike against the aggressor would be inevitable and would reduce to nothing all the advantages which

the attacking side would wish to derive. Such potential, according to the theory, makes the launching of a first strike pointless and suicidal and is considered the basis of stability even in periods of international crises.

However, in connection with the enhanced efficiency of strategic weapons systems and, consequently, the increased vulnerability of key components of the CCS, which, in addition, are in a number of instances more susceptible to the destructive factors of a nuclear explosion than the weapons systems themselves, serious fears that a direct attack on the CCS could be even more effective in the plane of averting retaliation than an attack on the strategic arms as such arise. In any event, if an aggressor sets as his goal the weakening of the power of the enemy's retaliatory strike, the decommissioning of the CCS would facilitate considerably the accomplishment of such an action. The development of ASAT systems and other space-based assault weapons would create an even greater danger for the control and communications complex. Under conditions, on the other hand, of the crisis development of the military and political situation in the world the said factor would exert an even more serious destabilizing influence since it could increase incentives for launching a preemptive strike.

General Characteristics and Basic Functions of Modern CCS

Strategic CCS consist of three main components. These are a system of the early warning, gathering and processing of reconnaissance data (early warning and photo and electronic reconnaissance satellites, radar stations and radio-intercept stations); political and military leadership command centers (both stationary underground and ground-based and mobile ground-, air- and sea-based); and communications systems uniting the first two components between themselves and with the direct effectors of the orders of the leadership (SSBN and strategic bomber crews and ICBM launch control post operational teams).

This complex affords the sides' military and political leadership an opportunity to exercise constant control over the strategic forces in peacetime; given a crisis development of the situation, to control the switch of these forces to enhanced combat readiness and, if necessary, to issue the order for their immediate use.

From the viewpoint of the tasks which they perform all functions of the CCS may be divided into two basic categories. The first is its use in peacetime. It implies assured stable communications between the top and lower command echelons, the gathering and processing of military information and the monitoring of the strategic and operational situation and also assured so-called negative control of nuclear arsenals. The latter means maintaining the appropriate level of combat readiness of

the strategic forces given the obligatory and unswerving technical blocking of the unsanctioned or accidental use of nuclear weapons (as a result of a technical malfunction, for example).

The functions of the CCS pertaining to the second category amount to its transfer to a prewar and war footing, when the exercise of positive control, that is, the transmission of orders of the military and political leadership and control of their execution under the conditions of the start of combat operations at the strategic level, moves to the fore. In other words, positive control is to provide assurances that the leadership's sanction of the use of nuclear weapons be complied with. It is this sphere which is at the present time the subject of the closest attention of a number of important studies in the field of problems of arms limitation and the prevention of nuclear war. (Footnote 1)

It should be mentioned that the specific features of individual types of strategic arms permit the exercise of strict control over them to a varying extent. Thus ICBM's deployed in launch silos represent from the negative control viewpoint the most dependable component of the strategic triad. The multi-backup system of space- and air-based and underground communication links assures for the military and political leadership certainty that operational orders will be transmitted and received, and the corresponding operations of the effectors, controlled.

Strategic aviation is in a different situation. Reliable communications with the air bases make it possible, if necessary, to transmit an order for its emergency takeoff from the airfields. But, once airborne, the heavy bombers must not leave the defined zones in which radio communications operate. This increases the degree of their vulnerability and also gives rise to doubts that communications with the aircraft will provide for the possibility of control of compliance with all the orders of the command. In addition, in the event of strategic aviation leaving the defined zones, communications with it could be severed completely. Nonetheless, the central leadership still has sufficiently extensive opportunities for exercising negative control over strategic aviation's nuclear weapons, which makes their unsanctioned use barely likely.

Its exercise over the sea-based component of the strategic triad represents a far greater danger. In view of the absence of reliable two-way communications and the vulnerability and complexity of the functioning of airborne relay systems, the United States has introduced a system of control in respect of SSBN on combat patrol at sea whereby technical negative control from the center is lacking entirely. This means that the crew of a missile-firing submarine has in principle, if not organizational authority, the technical possibility of unlocking and launching SLBM's without the sanction of the central leadership. This probability, even if very slight, compels a view of SSBN from the standpoint of impact on the

stability of the strategic balance somewhat different from what is customary in the United States, despite the assertions of American officials and experts that the high survivability of the submarines themselves in the ocean assures their "stabilizing" role. As far as the Soviet SSBN are concerned, they are, according to accessible data, equipped with the more dependable locking of the nuclear weapons, that is, are in a posture of strict negative control from the center. The area of patrolling of the preponderance of the submarines close to the shores of the USSR (for the purpose of surer protection against NATO ASW weapons) contributes to this also. (Footnote 2)

Thus the strategic forces' CCS does not at the present time allow the military and political leadership to exercise control over nuclear arms to an equal extent. In a period of crisis or under the conditions of the start of combat operations the shortcomings of the CCS (both its unreliability and vulnerability) could perform a sharply destabilizing role, in the plane of the probability of loss of control over one's own strategic forces included.

The enhancement of the operational specifications of offensive arms is undermining each side's confidence that this CCS component or the other will survive as a result of a nuclear strike. For example, according to the data of American studies, the North American Air and Space Defense Command (NORAD) Headquarters, which was located for the purpose of its increased protection in the interior of the granite rock of Cheyenne Mountain (Colorado), is regarded in the United States at the present time merely as the center of the operation of the CCS in peacetime and also of the reception, evaluation and transmission to the leadership of the signal warning of the launch and approach of ballistic missiles. The probability of its survival as the result of a direct hit is considered very low. (Footnote 3)

Such fears concerning the relatively increased vulnerability of the CCS are being expressed in a whole number of foreign studies. Specifically, B. Blair, director of the program for studying CCS problems of the U.S. Congress' Office of Technology Assessment, observes: "The mutual vulnerability of the command systems creates a strong impetus for a nuclear first strike before the enemy realizes his threat to this system.... For this reason both sides will be under growing pressure in favor of launching a preventive strike under crisis conditions." (Footnote 4)

The increased threat of the direct destruction of the combat control system emanates not only from "exotic" arms of the future. Even now a number of weapons models is creating the danger of the decommissioning of basic CCS components. It is a question of cruise missiles, sea-based primarily, which, owing to the concealment of their flight, may deliver surprise attacks against early warning facilities (radar installations). The new sea-based ballistic missiles with enhanced counterforce potential should be distinguished particularly. The short

time of the approach to target, a matter of minutes in a number of cases, and the unpredictable bearings of the attack create a real threat of the sudden decommissioning of the warning system and important control centers, airfields and airborne command posts and the disruption of communications channels. Such a danger in crisis periods makes the unleashing of nuclear war more likely.

A report of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat observes in this connection: "The paramount significance of stability of the military balance is manifested in the extent to which the actual characteristics of the given strategic correlation of forces make in an acute conflict situation an exchange of nuclear strikes more or, on the contrary, less likely." (Footnote 5) It is precisely individual weapons systems with this attribute or the other and also their control system which are the principal components of this strategic correlation.

As a result an essentially paradoxical picture is taking shape: together with the increase in the survivability of individual strategic offensive arms systems the CCS, which is of key significance, remains the most vulnerable component of the sides' strategic potentials. This is attested by, specifically, the fact that at the present time U.S. specialists consider the most invulnerable components of the combat control complex airborne command posts, whereas among nuclear weapons strategic aviation is seen as an increasingly vulnerable component of the strategic triad.

The CCS and the 'Launch on Warning' Concept

In view of the complication of the tasks and growth of the vulnerability of the CCS two main ways of solving the problem are being discussed among specialists: simplifying the tasks of the control system and concentrating attention on increasing its survivability or reducing the emphasis on survivability to satisfy the growing demands of the operational assignments of the strategic forces. In the strategic arms sphere a tendency to move along the second path is being manifested, it would seem, which is fraught with dangerous and largely unpredictable consequences. A direction of such a development is the utmost increase in the speed of operation of the CCS and introduction to operational plans of the "launch on warning" concept, that is, the firing of missiles immediately upon receipt and confirmation of information on the launch of the enemy's strategic systems. Specifically, at the time of choice of basing mode for the American MX ICBM a most acute question was that of use of the existing Minuteman ICBM launch siloes. The opponents of stationary basing pointed out here that the vulnerability of the MX ICBM in silos was a destabilizing factor and would compel an orientation toward launch on warning, which would increase the risk of the outbreak of war.

The evolution of the strategic correlation of forces and military concepts spurred primarily by new initiatives of the United States in the arms race is objectively eroding strategic stability. An increase in the emphasis on launch on warning could in a certain situation be attended by serious dangers. Owing to the reduction in the time for decision-making in response to information of an attack or in an atmosphere of an unforeseen nuclear situation having arisen, the likelihood of an error or miscalculation, particularly at moments of crisis, increases. The short flight time of modern weapons systems and the reduced warning time owing to the deployment of cruise missiles, and in the future, systems employing Stealth technology leave no opportunity for a careful evaluation and recheck of information and the thinking over of a decision on retaliatory actions. Together with this some actions of a probable enemy could under crisis conditions be interpreted as the start of an attack, although the intentions of the opposite side here could be different (to assure the enhanced combat readiness of strategic weapons for surer "deterrence," for example). This applies, for example, to such scheduled measures of operational activity of the United States as the takeoff of strategic bombers from airfields, after which they could leave the field of vision of early warning facilities; the transfer of the entire CCS, including airborne components, to aerial patrolling; the approach of bombers to air-based cruise missile release zones; the dispersal of tactical nuclear weapons from their dumps; the delegating of the authority to use nuclear weapons from the center to the effectors; and such.

Extensive historical experience testifies that wars have not always started and, even less, proceeded in accordance with the strategic and operational plans drawn up by general headquarters in peacetime. Politically prewar crisis situations have more often than not developed unexpectedly, confounding the foreign policy premises which military planning took as the point of departure. Crises, regardless of whether they have developed into armed conflict or not, have been attended, as a rule, by great uncertainty in governments' decision-making, contradictory information and assessments of enemies' actions and intentions and vagueness concerning likely consequences of one's own actions. As far as the military aspect is concerned, the strategic and operational planning of peacetime has more often than not been thwarted in instances where states have arrived at war with qualitatively new arms and combat equipment not tested under combat conditions and deployed in the army in mass fashion. The existence of huge modern arsenals of diverse nuclear weapons, whose use would most likely mean the destruction of human civilization and life on Earth itself even, intensifies immeasurably the unpredictability, tension and danger of crisis situations slipping out of control.

The well-known Soviet historian D.M. Proektor observes in this connection: "The irrationalism of the political and military thinking and actions of the leaders of the aggressor countries is not only an attribute of the

personalities but also the result of many events and circumstances which are all interlinked and logically ensue from one another.... Is it possible to speak of the logic of war? In aggressors recognizing the rationality of world war this is the logic of the absurd. Initial erroneous decisions engender others, just as erroneous. There is an inexorable escalation of the absurd. The circle of irrationalism expands until its bindings snap.... If some leader is 'programmed' for a military solution, he will resort to it, although it is contrary to the situation and will lead to catastrophe. While another leader, but with a peaceful program tendency, adopting the wrong decision in crisis situations, will be no better off either." (Footnote 6)

Not only the colossal power of destruction of nuclear weapons and the inconceivable consequences of their use convert at the present time the said regularities of the evolution of crisis situations to a fundamentally different dimension. Two other circumstances impart to the problem even greater seriousness. First, it is a question of the fact that in recent decades the strategic concepts and military planning of the USSR and the United States and the Warsaw Pact and NATO have developed to a large extent independently of one another, proceeding from nonconcurring premises on how a conflict might arise and develop and on the kind of scenarios and purposes of the sides' use of military force. Of course, the possibilities and intentions of a likely enemy have been taken into consideration here. However, they have been evaluated frequently with one's own ideas concerning the opposite side being taken as the starting point, without due analysis of its true motives and plans.

For example, NATO's military planning has traditionally proceeded from the idea of the gradual escalation of military operations, in accordance with which, following the utmost exacerbation of the political situation and mutual threats, wide-ranging combat operations of conventional armed forces on land, at sea and in the air begin. At a particular moment they develop into the use of tactical nuclear weapons, later, medium-range nuclear weapons, then, "selective" strikes by strategic arms, and only then, if the conflict does not cease, into the total annihilation of the population and industry of the warring parties. These five levels of the "ladder of escalation" have never been recognized and accepted by the Soviet Union and its allies inasmuch as the very use of medium-range and operational-tactical nuclear arms is tantamount for them in the practical plane to deep concentrated nuclear strikes against their territory. For this reason the military strategy and plans of the Warsaw Pact regard first use of nuclear weapons as transition to the nuclear phase of the conflict, which will not be of a limited nature and will inevitably develop into a world catastrophe. (Footnote 7) At the same time, however, the principles of the use of tactical nuclear weapons (land mines, artillery, air defense missiles, antisubmarine missiles and torpedoes, for example) are profoundly interwoven in the operational planning of NATO's conventional forces. And the military concepts of the Warsaw Pact allow of the probability of the use of conventional weapons against an enemy's nuclear arms. (Footnote 8)

The said most serious differences in the sides' strategic views, premises and plans threaten in a conflict situation to evoke their entirely different perception of identical events and to entail a catastrophic miscalculation in respect of the actions and intentions of the enemy.

Second, the unprecedented dimensions of the military machinery permanently maintained by the states' allies and the immeasurably grown power, range, diversity, mobility and interdependence of the branches of the armed forces, arms of the service, units and subunits and individual arms even have now raised to an unprecedented extent the demands on the coordination of action of all components of the sides' forces and resources. This imposes a tremendous burden on the functioning of the intelligence, data evaluation, control and communications systems. The troops' accomplishment of the set assignments depends more than ever on their unswerving compliance with the plans for a switch to heightened combat readiness, deployment for military operations and precisely coordinated transition to performance of the assignments.

This applies primarily to the strategic nuclear forces, but increasingly to conventional armed forces and arms also. Operational plans are drawn up on a permanent basis. They are periodically adjusted and honed at field and staff exercises. These plans encompass the operations of hundreds of thousands of effectors at all levels and provide for coordination of their operations over areas of many thousands of kilometers, as far as a global scale, and synchronization in time down to hours, minutes and seconds even.

All this leads to a lack of time for the political leadership's evaluation of the situation and decision-making in a crisis situation. It could be faced with a terrible dilemma: waiting for the situation to clarify and improvising, making chaotic the functioning of the armed forces and giving the other side tremendous advantages if the latter is bent on attack, or acting in accordance with some operational plan drawn up in advance, the correspondence of which to the actual military-political situation cannot be considered absolutely reliable. In both cases the probability of a nuclear catastrophe could prove very high. It is in this knot of political, psychological and military-technical factors that the greatest threat of a nuclear war being unleashed is now contained, it would seem. If in peacetime, in a tranquil atmosphere, political leaders do not pay due attention to strategic and operational plans and do not contribute elements of political commonsense to purely military logic, which, naturally, is always geared to the most efficient performance of operational assignments possible, they run the risk of losing control over events at the most crucial moment.

Such concepts and plans as the delegation to the effectors of authority for the use of nuclear weapons, certain measures for the transfer of forces and resources to heightened combat readiness and launch on warning

increase to the greatest extent the danger of the uncontrollable unleashing of nuclear war examined above. Specifically, the launch on warning concept, while theoretically a factor of additional deterrence of a potential aggressor, could in an actual crisis situation increase the likelihood of a breakdown of the military-political mutual deterrence system. The greater the extent to which the strategic forces and their warning, control and communications system are oriented toward the launch on warning concept, the fewer the opportunities they afford for a careful evaluation of the situation and the thinking over of retaliatory steps and their realization.

The authoritative American specialist J. Steinbruner emphasizes: "Nuclear arms are permanently maintained at a high level of combat readiness and are adapted for such rapid response to information of impending attack that the difference between the retaliatory and first strikes is extremely negligible and could disappear completely under the pressure of an intense crisis situation.... Although the deterrent effect of the existing balance of forces is strong enough to dominate all rational judgments," he points out, "this does not guarantee the prevention of war.... It is important to note that mutual deterrence has never been tested for reliability, which would be the case under crisis conditions, when both sides would simultaneously begin the transfer of their forces to heightened combat readiness. There is reason to fear that the innate tendency of preemptive transition to the performance of military operations would in practice be very strong if war came to seem inevitable...." (Footnote 9)

Furthermore, given the preferred orientation of one side or both toward launch on warning, a hope of "out-flanking" or blocking the early warning system, which is theoretically possible given use of the new types of weapons, could arise. Escalation to nuclear war could obviously occur in two main directions: given the increased probability of the surprise decommissioning of the early warning system and other key components of the CCS (command posts, communications centers and so forth) and also the use of weapons systems and tactics of strikes reducing to the maximum the time of warning of the attack. It is essential to bear in mind here that, knowing in advance of the orientation of the forces of his adversary toward launch on warning, an enemy is capable of employing various options of attack in order to specially foil the possibility of such a launch or preempt it. The adoption of new systems of strategic weapons with a short flight time and warning time, the use of preliminary nuclear explosions in the stratosphere to create an electromagnetic pulse and block radio communications and various measures to deceive warning systems and disrupt their backup principle could contribute to this. Specifically, the "Stealth" technology for strategic aviation and cruise missiles being developed by the United States is designed to accomplish the task of the increased concealment of the flight of strategic systems to the targets and, consequently, a sharp reduction in the time of warning of the attack.

Throughout the postwar period the United States has resorted repeatedly to a heightening of the level of combat readiness of its strategic forces as a reaction to certain international events and also for the purpose of honing the very procedure of transition to a higher level of combat readiness. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has not once, according to authoritative Western studies, performed such operations. (Footnote 10) Thus throughout the history of the existence of nuclear arms there has not yet been an instance of both principal nuclear powers simultaneously engaging in operations to transfer their strategic forces to a higher level of combat readiness, which could have led to an extremely uncertain situation. The same applies to the delegating of authority for the use of nuclear weapons.

The side delegating such authority to the effectors under crisis conditions, proceeding here from the fact that it would not have time to carry out a launch on warning or deliver a retaliatory strike, runs the risk thereby of bringing about unpredictable consequences. By such a step this power could attempt to demonstrate to an enemy that his attack would not achieve "decapitation". The enemy, on the other hand, could perceive this delegating as reliable evidence of preparation for a first strike and acquire strong impetus for a preemptive attack. For this reason the vulnerability of the CCS and its orientation toward speed of operation would under such conditions create an additional threat of the growth of a political crisis into an armed clash, and a conventional conflict, into a nuclear catastrophe.

In addition, the very delegation of the said authority means that the central leadership is releasing control of its own forces, although under crisis conditions it is extremely important to preserve complete negative control over them precluding the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons. Here lies an in-built contradiction between negative and positive control under crisis conditions given the high vulnerability of the CCS: each side is afraid of not having the time to carry out a launch on warning (doubting the possibility of delivering a retaliatory strike), which prompts it to raise the level of combat readiness of its forces and delegate authority for the use of nuclear weapons. This, in turn, increases the suspicion of the opponent and creates a greater threat of an uncontrolled escalation of the conflict.

Together with this strategic "resonance" the central leadership could deprive itself of the possibility of fully controlling the situation. As a result miscalculations or errors of the effectors sanctioned to launch on warning are fraught with the high probability of the unpremeditated unleashing of nuclear war. At the same time the delegating of authority could objectively contribute not only to a prolongation of the crisis but its growth into uncontrolled escalation since the restoration of the central leadership's negative control over the nuclear forces could present considerable difficulties. This applies primarily to the sea- and air-based segments of the strategic

triad. Thus after having obtained the appropriate sanction, the SSBN could escape from control completely, particularly under the conditions of a conventional war being fought at sea, when they would more than likely be the target of enemy ASW activity. An attempt to go on the air under such conditions would increase the probability of disclosure of the SSBN's whereabouts. Aviation also could escape the field of vision of radio communications and not receive the corresponding orders from the central leadership. In addition, the communications systems themselves could prove a target of attack even without the use of nuclear weapons (given the assistance of ASAT systems, for example). All this would contribute to a considerable extent to the growth of the threat of the start of a nuclear war.

Proceeding from this, the modernization of the CCS for the purpose of its increased protection would, as a whole, seem quite justified and rational. But there are many contradictions here also: the programs being implemented in this sphere, in a broad range of directions, could contribute to the growth of its survivability to a very considerable extent, but at the same time a new danger is created also—the creation as a supplement to the structure of the strategic offensive arms also of a system of control thereof, which are in sum intended to provide for the possibility of fighting a protracted controlled nuclear war. On the pretext of a strengthening of deterrence this task is at the present time moving to the fore in the organizational development of the U.S. armed forces.

Contrary to such assertions, this strategy fits ill with deterrence and will most likely lead to the undermining of strategic stability. As Academician M. Markov observes, "the upgrading of nuclear weapons in recent decades, on which trillions of dollars have been spent, has in fact led to a weakening or erosion of the idea of nuclear deterrence and the increased likelihood of nuclear war." (Footnote 11) Many authoritative American experts are pointing to this also. Specifically, a report of the Union of Concerned Scientists published in 1986 and devoted to an assessment of the program of "modernization" of the United States' strategic forces, observes: "Deterrence is the proclaimed goal of U.S. strategy, but the requirements of deterrence are formulated such that they are in practice synonymous with the possibility of fighting a nuclear war and 'winning' it." (Footnote 12) All this fully confirms the proposition of the 27th CPSU Congress that continuation of the nuclear arms race could lead to a position "where even parity ceases to be a factor of military-political deterrence."

From the theoretical standpoint a CCS with precise and realistically preset specifications could contribute, it would seem, to the goals of a strengthening of strategic stability and limitation of potentials to a reasonable sufficiency. First, it must be capable of surviving in the event of a surprise attack, but it would not be required to remain stable for more than a few hours under goal-directed nuclear strikes. Second, such a system must

provide for the possibility of a careful recheck and evaluation of information on the attack, the adoption of a considered decision and the transmission of an order to the surviving forces on the delivery of a nuclear strike against the aggressor and then control of its execution. After this, the given system could cease to exist. The said CCS would be quite simple and constructed on the basis of backups for such of its basic components as facilities for the warning and rapid evaluation of the consequences of an enemy nuclear strike, ground-based mobile and airborne command posts and communications channels. The leadership of the country must exercise complete negative control here, being in constant two-way stable communication with its forces even after an opponent's attack in order to determine the presence of surviving forces and resources and, if necessary, transmit a command on retargeting (in order to make good the loss of some part of the forces) and the delivery of a retaliatory strike.

In practice such a system would differ appreciably from the CCS necessary for fighting a protracted war. It would need high survivability, but would not need a capacity for superfast operation for effecting a launch on warning and the performance of most intricate operations pertaining to a redrawing of military plans and the recoordination of attacks in accordance with the rapidly changing situation of nuclear war. Inasmuch as the demands on survivability in the event of a surprise attack on the one hand and all the other enumerated functions on the other are technically and economically competitive, renunciation of the latter would permit the accomplishment with enhanced reliability of the main and precisely limited assignments of preservation of retaliatory strike potential.

The CCS in the Context of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

Discussion of questions connected with the influence of the CCS on the entire spectrum of the sides' strategic mutual relations is becoming an increasingly pertinent problem at the present time. This is connected with the proposal advanced by the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries concerning discussion and comparison of the military doctrines of the opposed military-political groupings and the embodiment in practice of the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons and Soviet initiatives in the nuclear disarmament sphere. These questions are arising with particular seriousness in connection with the growing threat to the CCS on the part of new, more efficient weapons systems, both nuclear and "exotic," including the space-based weapons being developed per the SDI program.

Not only a quantitative buildup of arms but, which is now even more material, their rapid qualitative improvement are taking place in the course of the military rivalry. Consequently, strategic concepts and operational plans and assignments are becoming more complex and the demands on the capacity for obtaining

and evaluating information in the course of combat operations, the coordination and multivariant nature of targeting and the speed and flexibility of retargeting are growing—and all this falls fully to the combat control system. The process thus moves in a closed circle: the buildup and upgrading of offensive arms increases appreciably the demands made on the CCS system proper and simultaneously increases the threat to the CCS of the other side. The programs of an upgrading of this system, in turn, increase the efficiency of the strategic arms potentials, permit the accomplishment of increasingly complex assignments, increase the threat to the enemy's forces and control facilities and so forth. These processes are seriously influencing strategic planning and programs and also the likelihood of the outbreak of war in a crisis situation.

Viewing the question of arms limitation and reduction with regard for the CCS factor, it is necessary first of all, it would seem, to analyze thoroughly the extent to which the proposed steps might contribute to a strengthening of strategic stability: to the sides' renunciation, first, of the advance delegating of authority for the use of nuclear weapons and, second, of the launch on warning concept. Together with a lessening of the threat to the strategic forces measures to lessen the threat to the CCS should be of special, if not paramount, significance in this connection.

One such step could be an agreement on renunciation of the creation and deployment of sea-based counterforce systems—both SLBM's and cruise missiles owing to their clearly manifest destabilizing characteristics. The short flight time of the first and the concealment of the deployment and flight to target of the second create the greatest threat to the CCS, it would seem. This applies both to the infrastructure of the control systems (radars, command centers, communication centers) and the military-political leadership centers. Such an agreement (either separate or within the framework of a broader accord), bolstered by confidence-building measures in this sphere (a ban, for example, on the approach of SSBN and cruise missile-firing submarines closer than a certain zone to the shores of the other country), could contribute to an appreciable strengthening of strategic stability.

Upon realization of the concept of deep cuts in strategic offensive arms it would be useful to provide for the cuts leading also to a simplification of the assignments entrusted to these forces. The significant surpluses of strike arms constituting potential for annihilation many times over inevitably entail the elaboration of more refined concepts pertaining to their use and new forms and methods of targeting and the advancement of a variety of concepts of "protracted and limited" nuclear war and "victory" in such a war. An injection of commonsense in strategic planning and a parallel reduction in arms and an upgrading of the concept of their use in the light of the idea of minimum sufficiency (the possibility, say, of unacceptable damage being caused the

main industrial centers in the course of a retaliatory strike) would also play a positive part in the plane of a strengthening of stability.

Particular importance in the sides' strategic relations is attached to an evaluation of measures to reduce the likelihood of escalation of a conflict and transition from crisis to military confrontation. It would be highly advisable for this reason to introduce to the practice of international relations notification not only of military exercises but also certain types of activity of the strategic forces (with an explanation of the purposes thereof) such as, for example, the movement of a significant number of SSBN's from their bases and the takeoff from airfields of strategic bombers.

Together with this it is essential to adopt measures to further upgrade emergency communication lines between the leadership of the two countries and implement practical actions pertaining to the creation of crisis-elimination centers. The Soviet-American agreement on the creation of centers to reduce the nuclear danger signed on 15 September 1987 and the protocols thereto were an important step on this path. A positive role could be performed also by the discussion of military doctrines and concepts, the mutual renunciation of measures to enhance the level of combat readiness of the strategic forces as a means of political pressure and renunciation of protracted nuclear war concepts. Recognition by the political leadership of the USSR and the United States of the fact that there would be no winners in a nuclear war should be underpinned by practical actions attesting the sides' sincere aspiration to avoid the outbreak thereof by all means.

As far as the CCS directly is concerned, an exchange of opinions specifically on these questions also would, it would seem, be highly useful. Proceeding from the fact that in accordance with the logic of the new thinking in the security sphere the sides should manifestly be interested in the growth of the survivability and reliability of the given systems and their simplification and reduced vulnerability, the problem of a reduction in the threat to the CCS could be an integral part of the talks on limiting and reducing strategic offensive arms and banning ASAT weapons and other types of space-based assault weapons.

From the viewpoint of stability it is essential, we believe, when evaluating strategic offensive arms to conceive of a composition and structure thereof most satisfying the requirements of defense. While nuclear weapons continue to constitute the basis of the combat might of the leading powers it is essential to exert the maximum efforts to ensure that these weapons never be activated. In line with the limitation of and reduction in strategic offensive arms ultimately aimed at their complete elimination the establishment of a structure of forces which would reduce to the minimum the probability of the use (either as a premeditated step, out of fear of an enemy

attack or as the result of an uncontrolled escalation of a conflict) of nuclear weapons in a crisis situation could, it would seem, serve this task as an interim aim.

Simply having certain potential for a devastating retaliatory strike based on relatively invulnerable nuclear forces is manifestly insufficient in this plane. These forces and their control system must also completely preclude the possibility of the unsanctioned or accidental use of nuclear weapons and have dependable two-way communications, which would make it possible to renounce the delegating of authority for their use in a crisis period, that is, maintain their strictly centralized negative control. Finally, a nature of these forces such as would not require for the performance of the assignments of a retaliatory strike entrusted to them their organization on the basis of a launch on warning system would seem expedient. Only in this case might it be possible to speak of a strengthening of strategic stability and a lessening of the threat of the outbreak of thermo-nuclear war.

Footnotes

* This article, in which the authors set forth their idea, is published by way of formulation of the problem.

** In Western literature this system has been designated C³I (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence). Different terminology is employed with reference to the USSR Armed Forces, which is caused partly by the different structure and characteristics of this system. The importance thereof was pointed out back in the 1970's in many works of Soviet military specialists, who noted that "exceptional significance is now attached to the high combat readiness of all components of leadership and the entire system of control and communications as a whole.... The readiness of the control and communications system should be somewhat in advance of the overall readiness of the formations, units and subunits, precede it and be higher and more mobile than it" (A.A. Grechko, "The Armed Forces of the Soviet State," Moscow, 1975, p 266).

1. See B. Blair, "Strategic Command and Control. Redefining the Nuclear Threat". The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1985, pp 289-293.

2. "Managing Nuclear Operations". Edited by A. Carter, J. Steinbruner, C. Zraket. The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1987, p 508.

3. See T. Karas, "The New High Ground. Strategies and Weapons of Space-Age War," New York, 1983, p 35.

4. B. Blair, Op. cit., p 285.

5. "Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Reductions in Nuclear Arms". Brief account of the study (adapted version). Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat, Moscow, April 1987, p 7.

6. D.M. Proektor, "World Wars and the Fate of Mankind," Moscow, 1986, pp 15, 26.

7. See N.V. Ogarkov, "History Teaches Vigilance," Moscow, 1985, p 68.

8. See "Military-Technical Progress and the USSR Armed Forces," Moscow, 1982, p 301.

9. THE BROOKINGS REVIEW, Summer 1987, pp 23-24.

10. See "Managing Nuclear Operations," pp 76-77.

11. PRAVDA, 14 July 1987.

12. P. Clausen, A. Krass, R. Zirkle, "In Search of Stability: an Assessment of New U.S. Nuclear Forces. A Report by the Union of Concerned Scientists," Cambridge (Mass.), 1986, p 3.

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Yearbook on Disarmament, Security Reviewed
18160004z Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 12, Dec 87 (signed to press 17 Nov 87) pp 124-125

[V. Karpov review: "In the Spirit of the New Thinking"]

[Text] The USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO Disarmament and International Security Department prepared and published jointly with Novosti its annual analytical survey (Ye.M. Primakov, executive editor, A.G. Arbatov, leader of the group of authors).^{*} This publication in two volumes in Russian and English, largely innovative for our scientific publications, is specific testimony to the extension of the policy of a broadening of glasnost and openness to the sphere of foreign policy and military organizational development.

The work makes an attempt, successful, on the whole, to reveal the essence and focus of Soviet foreign policy initiatives and show their businesslike, constructive nature and orientation toward satisfaction of man's vital interests—a strengthening of international peace and security. The progress of realization of the propositions of M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986 and

the responses to the Soviet program for the creation of the foundations of an all-embracing system of international security advanced by the 27th CPSU Congress are analyzed in detail.

The yearbook is distinguished by a wealth of factual material, extensive scientific-reference matter and an abundance of diagrams, graphs and tables cogently buttressing and explaining the Soviet concept of security and disarmament.

The readers' undoubted interest will be evoked by the thorough exposition of the sides' positions at the negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms in Geneva and the detailed analysis of the Soviet approach. Simultaneously with the portrayal of its compromise nature there is cogent criticism of the American line of deriving unilateral advantages through an infringement of the USSR's security and a departure from the Reykjavik accords. There is a comprehensive examination of the results of the Soviet-American top-level meeting in Iceland, which showed the possibility of a nuclear-free world, and the political struggle surrounding its results.

Great attention, which is perfectly natural considering the key importance of these questions for the cause of peace and security, is paid to problems of preventing an arms race in outer space and exposing the plans of the United States to achieve military superiority via space. Not only a list of the various programs within the SDI framework but a detailed scientific analysis graphically underpinned by a number of graphs and tables are presented here.

Particular relevance, considering the seriousness of the political and diplomatic struggle surrounding the problem, is attached to the attempt made in the yearbook to compare various nonstandard approaches to the problem of radical reductions in the armed forces and conventional arms of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Europe to the minimum level of a reasonable sufficiency for the purpose of precluding the possibility of surprise offensive operations.

For the first time, perhaps, a national work of recent times on the study of foreign policy contains an endeavor to combine a problem-solving approach to the subject matter of disarmament with a regional approach and an analysis of questions of a lessening of the military danger and a strengthening of military and political stability in various parts of the world. The comprehensive disclosure of the Soviet approach to the problems of a strengthening of security and an improvement in the situation in the Asia-Pacific region formulated by M.S. Gorbachev in his speech in Vladivostok in 1986 merits attention. In the next issue of the yearbook these questions could be studied in more detail with regard to the development of the Soviet position, including the Central Committee general secretary's interview with the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA.

The yearbook also studies on a sound scientific level certain topical problems of multilateral disarmament, specifically within the framework of the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament, and propounds the idea of the need for an intensification of the corresponding negotiations. There is detailed illustration of the efforts of the USSR and the socialist countries to strengthen the practice of nuclear nonproliferation and settle international conflicts and our country's activity in organizing broad international cooperation in the field of S&T progress, ensuring the safe development of nuclear power and exploring outer space for peaceful purposes.

While noting the high professional standard of the publication and the expert, documented approach to an exposition of events and problems in the sphere of arms limitation and international security I would like to express the confidence that its future issues will present more extensively, if only by way of debate, the differing viewpoints of Soviet scholars on key problems of international security and disarmament. I believe that there is today every reason to expect of Soviet science—with regard for the facts accessible to researchers—an in-depth analysis for the long term of the development of the situation at the negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms, the process of cuts in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe and the role of the United Nations and its bodies dealing with problems of disarmament and also of the Conference on Disarmament in the business of internationalization of the problems of arms limitation and disarmament. The elaboration of alternative versions and possible ways of a solution of questions would be of great significance in this respect.

The next annual issue of the publication (for 1987) could only benefit, evidently, were it to contain more of Soviet scholars' own opinions, calculations and forecasts. In working more extensively with accessible international information on military matters our social scientists could assimilate even more decisively problems of limitation of the arms race and disarmament which have yet to be scientifically illustrated. Live polemics with opponents and a cogent analysis of the views of bourgeois military experts permitting the more prominent illustration of the essence of the Soviet position on questions of security and disarmament would contribute to the increased impact of the published material.

Study of the prospects and role in international relations of the nuclear potentials of China, Britain and France, the possibility of these states subscribing in the future to the nuclear disarmament process and the likely development of events in Europe following the elimination of the Soviet and American INF and operational-tactical missiles would be of great interest and practical significance.

With regard for the situation taking shape, more attention should have been paid, in our view, to the problem of radical reductions in conventional arms, an examination of various nonstandard concepts of reasonable sufficiency, "nonoffensive," "unprovocative" defenses and

so forth, the prospects of reductions in and the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons and promotion of the Warsaw Pact countries' initiative concerning comparison of the military doctrines of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

The problem of a ban on chemical weapons and the possibility of the activation of new factors for the purpose of promoting nuclear nonproliferation and a ban on nuclear testing merits further in-depth study.

I would like to see the authors of the yearbook for 1987 devote more space together with attention to a critical analysis of practical subjects to fundamental problems like, for example, study of the concept of strategic stability in all its aspects linked with deep cuts in strategic offensive arms and prevention of the appearance of weapons in space.

It would also be desirable to see in the work more specific forecasts, brought closer to reality, of the development of the military and political situation in the world and an investigation of possible ways of solving the problems which will confront the Soviet foreign policy of the future.

Questions of the relationship of disarmament and security and the settlement of international conflicts, specifically, the Iran-Iraq and Near East conflicts and that in Central America, merit separate study.

Wishing the participants in this work new successes, we express confidence that specialists and all those with an interest in foreign policy and the international situation—in the USSR and abroad—have acquired a new and interesting publication which has a highly promising future.

Footnote

* "Razoruzheniye i bezopasnost. 1986. Yezhegodnik" [Disarmament and Security. 1986. Yearbook], in two volumes, Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO, Novosti, 1987, vol I 256pp, vol II 244pp.

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Examination of U.S. Binary Weapons, Delivery Vehicles

18010310z Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Feb 88 p 3

[Article by M. Platunov, engineer, under the rubric "Military Technical Review": "Creators of 'Binary Death'"]

[Text] The production line in American enterprises that produces "binary death" is gathering steam. Apropos of this, THE WASHINGTON POST newspaper put it this

way: "The start of production of binary munitions in a military plant in Pine Bluff, in the south of Arkansas, is viewed by Pentagon officials as an event that has a symbolic meaning: it has put an end to the 14-year fight of the army to overcome opposition in the country and to win the support of congress with respect to appropriations for the production of more than 1 million binary artillery projectiles, each of which is capable of killing hundreds of people in 2 to 5 minutes. . ."

The 155-mm artillery projectile also belongs to the new generation of chemical munitions that are called binary. The word "binary" means that a munition consists of two parts or components that are stored separately. When separated they have little toxicity, but when mixed they react and form a toxic agent.

According to information from the journal JANE'S DEFENSE REVIEW, the binary 155-mm projectile, designated M687, has the components difluorene, which is placed in the nose of the projectile, and isopropanol. The capsule with this substance is stored separately and is placed in the bottom part of the projectile in the process of its immediate preparation for firing. During firing, the "partition" that separates the components collapses. At the time of projectile flight to the target, the interaction that forms the nerve paralysis toxic agent—sarin—is completed. The spinning of the projectile on a trajectory at a speed of up to 25 revolutions per second promotes the complete flow of the components. The projectile blast is produced in the area of enemy manpower dispositions.

U.S. ground forces and marines have in their weapons inventory several thousand 155-mm self-propelled and towed guns (also including the M109A2 howitzer) capable of firing binary projectiles for a distance of up to 20 km. It is also planned subsequently to start production of a projectile with the very same makeup for the 203.2-mm howitzer. Besides artillery munitions, the U.S. is also creating other types of binary munitions. Thus, the binary warhead XM-135 is planned for the 227-mm salvo fire MLRS rocket system. This system, as is known, has been in the weapons inventory of the U.S. Army starting in the 1980s. The troops have already received about 300 combat vehicles that have a range of fire of 32 km with a rocket projectile with a warhead weighing 159 kg, and with a lighter one (107 kg), to a range up to 40 km. With one salvo, this 12-shot launcher load, columnists observe, can in 50 seconds destroy a target located in an area with dimensions of 400 by 1,000 meters.

According to foreign press data, the XM-135 warhead should be ready for series production in the 1991 fiscal year. But the Pentagon plans to organize the output of the "Bigeye" binary chemical aviation bomb before this. It is filled with binary components that form the toxic agent of the VX type which, like sarin, has a nerve paralysis effect, but which is even more fatal.

The "Bigeye" aviation bomb is one of three types of new generation chemical weapons which, according to a recent statement by President R. Reagan, has "a vitally important significance for U.S. national security." This assertion not only contradicts recent events, but it also shows the true attitude of the American administration toward chemical disarmament.

The production of "binary death" promises someone large profits. Ninety million dollars is appropriated for this purpose, and the newest chemical weapon should begin to appear no later than 1990.

The U.S. Air Force intends to arm tactical fighters and ground attack aircraft with the "Bigeye" bomb, including squadrons of "F-4," "F-16," and "F-111" aircraft deployed in western Europe. The Navy plans to place the "Bigeye" bomb on aircraft carriers and to employ it with the help of carrier aircraft. Binary warheads can also be carried by cruise missiles of the "Harpoon" type and by some other missiles of the "air-to-ground" class.

According to a statement of American specialists, "the important advantage that binary munitions have over conventional chemical weapons is their safety in the production process and during transportation and operational employment."

Covering themselves with references to a chemical threat, which supposedly comes from the Soviet Union, U.S. ruling circles are speeding up the implementation of the "chemical rearmament" program. A manifestation of this, in particular, is the buildup in annual production capacity of up to 700,000 binary artillery projectiles and aviation bombs, and the intention of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to increase the number of chemical munitions at its disposal, including binary munitions, from 3 to 5 million units.

In analyzing the state of affairs with respect to binary munitions, many foreign observers note that the binary program is the reason why the U.S. recently began to hold up ongoing negotiations in Geneva on a ban on chemical weapons, and that these actions are nothing more than an attempt to torpedo the process of chemical disarmament.

13052

SIPRI Director Stuetzle on 'Nonoffensive Defense' Concept

IZVESTIYA Interview

*52001056 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Mar 88 p 5*

[Interview with Walter Stuetzle, director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, by A. Sychev; date and place not specified; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] The apparent shift in the world away from confrontation to the strengthening of trust and security and to the development of cooperation between states, the

conclusion, of course, of the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of their intermediate and shorter-range missiles, and the reality of the reduction of strategic arms by half have all noticeably increased the interest in possible means of resolving military strategic problems under the new conditions that are arising. Some experts see one of the ways to resolve these problems to be the realization of the idea of "nonprovocative defense." At the request of IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Sychev, Walter Stuetzle, director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), tells about its content.

[Question] How does the institute formulate the essence of "nonprovocative defense?" In what stage is the development of this concept?

[Answer] Its meaning is simple enough: restructure the armed forces of the states in such a way that they do not evoke a perception of a threat either in the East or in the West. This common formula is the basis of the idea.

"Nonprovocative defense" is not yet receiving any attention at official levels. It continues to be only a proposal. I am not certain whether it was discussed in the scope of the Vienna meeting of states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or whether it has been included in the mandate of the the next round of negotiations.

It is still very early to say whether this idea has attained the nature of a concept. Scientific research in this direction has heretofore been pursued only in the West. It may be that I am mistaken but according to my information not a single institute in the Warsaw Pact member states has tackled this subject. If "nonprovocative defense" really makes sense, then you too must carry out the appropriate research.

It was only recently that several of my colleagues from Poland and Hungary began work on "nonprovocative defense" on a bilateral basis with experts from the FRG and Sweden, respectively. Not a single meeting has been held, however, between specialists of the key states, and they are above all the USSR, United States, France, Poland, FRG, Great Britain and GDR. One can, of course, easily add a number of others to the countries that I named. It would be useful and important to know their opinion but the states enumerated above play a decisive role in the formulation of the military strategic situation in central Europe. They have never yet assembled at one table to express their opinion on this idea, its content and merits.

In speaking of Europe and security on the old continent, one encounters considerably broader problems—the future of the military blocs, the situation within the alliances and the interrelationships between their participants, the question of the role of the superpowers in Europe, and many others. It is a huge list. So that "nonprovocative defense" is still nothing more than a

term, nothing more and nothing less. We still have to perform the basic work of comparing the positions of states and of attempting to express a common understanding of the question.

[Question] Over the past years, nevertheless, scientists have probably outlined the main elements of perhaps even an ideal model of "nonprovocative defense." Thus, it seems to me that one of the problems that must be resolved is that of the search for the boundary between defensive and offensive weapons.

[Answer] I am hardly able to say what is an offensive or defensive weapon. Arms can have the nature of both simultaneously. The form in which they will appear depends upon the intention of those using them. It is possible, in particular, to view the systems being developed under the "Strategic Defense Initiative" program from this point of view. A weapon itself does not explode and does not shoot. It must be activated by man.

It is not so important whether SDI is an offensive or a defensive system. Much more significant is something else: Is SDI necessary? The answer is no. Mankind is not experiencing a shortage of weapons; quite the contrary, it is essential for us to reduce them seriously.

Today no one can say with certainty how SDI arms will work. Let us suppose that in the future some success is achieved but that by that time designers create effective anti-SDI systems. The only result will be the shift of the arms race to a higher level and security will not become more dependable. It is an absurdity. The United States and USSR must strictly observe the positions of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

During the meeting of the leaders of the United States and USSR in Washington, it was not possible to reach a common opinion. And therefore the representatives of the two states are now trying to speak on this subject in very general terms. I understand that in this way the sides want to secure the INF Treaty. This, by the way, is a very important achievement. Nevertheless, when it comes to reducing strategic arms, they will have to find a common denominator in their positions on such questions as whether or not the ABM Treaty meets present-day requirements and whether its traditional interpretation is correct. I hope that this work will be done.

[Question] In the course of the discussion of the interpretation of the ABM Treaty, they touched, in particular, upon its position on research, development and testing of arms based on new physical principles. What is your opinion on this matter?

[Answer] The main thing here is whether the United States and USSR agreed to contain the development of military technologies at their level on the day of the signing or at the level achieved over the past years. Today it is quite clear that both powers, judging by the statements of their experts with whom we talked, are of

the opinion that it is necessary to control not only the technology of today but of tomorrow as well. Thus, the sides understand the danger of new technological achievements. It is precisely for this reason that the ABM Treaty speaks of a consultative commission, which is obliged to eliminate ambiguities that arise in interpretation. Even before the signing of the ABM Treaty, the USSR and United States foresaw that such situations will arise. For this reason, the document itself stresses the necessity of the precise interpretation of its positions.

What has changed with time? Only the fact that people have joined the Washington administration who, it seems, believe that they are capable of changing the meaning of the treaty. I think that by and large today we have left this problem behind. The U.S. Congress intends to adhere to the traditional interpretation and has passed a resolution that is called upon to keep the current and future administrations from revising the treaty, from carrying out tests, and from creating weapons not permitted by the document.

This is in the United States. In the Soviet Union, if one can judge by the information that is known, they are also carrying out intensive research on similar arms—lasers and radar, for example. Certainly there is no Soviet SDI program similar to the one announced by President Reagan in March 1983. It is also obvious that in the Soviet Union they are prepared to reach an agreement that would stop the militarization of space. That is precisely how I understand the permission given to American congressmen to visit the radar station in Krasnoyarsk. That is a convincing act that eliminates some of the distrust.

[Question] In "nonprovocative defense," then, armed forces will be capable only of repelling an attack in their own territory. Such fundamental reorganization requires a review of existing military doctrines and strategies.

[Answer] There is no reason to doubt that under today's conditions neither of the sides is interested in a military conflict. But serious concern arises in connection with the strategies and doctrines adopted for the event of war both in the East and in the West. For it is a fact that the Soviet Union has an extremely offensive doctrine for defensive purposes. The way that it is formulated in the area that talks about victory in a war and that it can be won on foreign territory gives it a threatening nature.

Looking at the West, Poland, the GDR, the CSSR and, of course, the USSR find threatening the nature of the American doctrines and tactical air forces of the United States in Europe as well as the superiority of Western technology and naval ship groupings, units and formations moved by air. It is a clear threat.

A key objective of any discussion between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic alliance in the scope of the idea of "nonprovocative defense" must above all be the revelation of disturbing elements. The documents

adopted in Berlin at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact countries in May 1987 note the mutual nature of security interests but do not delve into what is causing anxiety, fear, and distrust. And this is understandable, for it is too early to talk about this. It is necessary to sit down to the negotiating table.

Why did this situation come about? Are there possibilities for changes? What must they be like? What, in the final analysis, are the elements of "nonprovocative defense?" Are we really worried only about artillery, tanks and tactical aviation or also about reserve forces, economic might, geographical advantages...? Let us find out in the course of the discussion what worries the East when it looks at the West and vice versa. Then ways to correct the situation will be revealed. And only when all claims are discussed, possibly, will it become clear whether "nonprovocative defense" has a future.

We must understand the ways we think about each other to be able to put forward proposals. I do not exclude the possibility that nothing will come out of this idea. We have proposals and assessments on "nonprovocative defense" in the scope of pure science but they are too hypothetical and artificial. We do not know what will remain of them after confronting reality.

The time has come to begin a dialogue. The countries of the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union in particular, are ready for it. At the same time, some Western countries are seriously perplexed by the positive signals from the East and are experiencing difficulties with accepting the invitation to dialogue. I have the impression that in the West they continue to be unprepared to talk about the essence of strategies and doctrines. The sides must approach one another and enter into a discussion. This is the only way to clarify and understand the reasons for the anxiety.

USSR's Semeyko Comments

52001056 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Mar 88 p 5

[Commentary of Lev Semeyko, doctor of historical sciences: "Commentary of a Soviet Specialist"]

[Text] The interview with SIPRI Director W. Stuetzle touches on the key problems in providing for security. It is clear that one cannot agree with all of his positions but this is quite natural.

The main thing is to find points of contact and, relying on them, to work out coordinated approaches. One of them, doubtless, is a positive assessment of the idea of "nonprovocative defense" (in the USSR, it is more often called "nonoffensive defense"). This idea is also being written into the new political thinking, for, as we understand, it foresees the renunciation of the use of force in resolving international problems, and also into the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, inasmuch as it has an

especially defensive orientation. The promotion of the idea of "nonoffensive defense" is a step in the right direction that is officially approved in the USSR.

Another matter is that it is necessary to discuss this idea thoroughly for its practical realization in the East as well as in the West, to discuss it at different levels. Soviet scientists have already begun to do so. And the fact that W. Stuetzle is showing his lack of information is quite characteristic: the exchange of information in Europe and in the world is still not very advanced. Meanwhile, an international meeting dedicated to "nonoffensive defense" was held in Moscow in May of last year at the initiative of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. Present at the meeting, in particular, were the prominent American scientist F. von Hippel and the well-known West German expert and deputy to the Bundestag A. von Buelow. Soviet representatives also took part in other international dialogues on this problem. Mention can be made, for example, of the annual Edinburgh meetings. This problem with its political and military aspects was also discussed in Soviet scientific and public organizations.

W. Stuetzle justifiably condemns SDI, although he does not consider it important to determine whether it is offensive or defensive. I think that precisely this question merits a fundamental assessment. From the Soviet point of view, SDI is not only hopeless politically and technically and therefore unnecessary. It is also extremely dangerous, because, in the final analysis, it foresees the deployment not so much of defensive as of offensive strike systems capable only of destabilizing the military and political situation through the constant threat of surprise attack.

At the same time, the thesis of W. Stuetzle on the Soviet "offensive" military doctrine is disappointing. It is again confirmed that the defensive nature of the military doctrinal aims of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies, aims adopted in May 1987 in Berlin, has still not become convincing enough in the West if even the most prominent experts underestimate it. This confirms once again the necessity of the dialogue and consultation proposed by the Warsaw Pact and of expanding scientific contacts on security problems. This will also make more clear the Soviet approach to the resolution of problems of the military balance with its asymmetries and disproportions and, the main thing, to the establishment of a nuclear-free world with reasonable and adequate armed forces, which would simply be incapable of carrying out offensive operations, and consequently, of aggression. Only in dialogue is it possible to bring our consciousness into harmony with the realities. Universal security can be ensured only through common efforts.

Deputy Foreign Minister on Warsaw Pact Meeting, European Security

52001064 Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 15, Apr 88 pp 5-6

[Interview with Vadim Loginov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs and alternate member of the CPSU Central Committee, by Alexander Didusenko]

[Excerpts] The Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member states met for a routine session in Sofia on March 29-30. After the Soviet delegation's return home Vadim Loginov, USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave an interview to New Times.

NEW TIMES What, in your opinion, are the chief results of the meeting? How it brought anything new?

V. Loginov Briefly, the Sofia meeting has reaffirmed the Warsaw Treaty member states' readiness to make every effort to help solve the vital problems of today—put an end to the arms race, prevent it from spreading to outer space, and make the current disarmament process and positive trends in the development of the international situation irreversible.

A number of important points merit special mention in this connection. First, the foreign ministers discussed a cluster of questions related to a continued and intensified Soviet-U.S. dialogue aimed at ending the arms race and going over to nuclear and chemical disarmament, to the reduction of the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe.

As the meeting was held shortly after the latest round of Eduard Shevardnadze's talks in Washington, the Soviet Foreign Minister informed his colleagues in detail of the content of the talks and the agreements reached, including the plan for the preparations for the U.S. President's visit to our country. The allied states' foreign ministers voiced their profound satisfaction at the results of the Soviet side's work. All the Soviet initiatives aimed at making the forthcoming summit a success met with support.

Second, and this was an entirely new development, the session adopted an address to the NATO member states and to all the participating states of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

NEW TIMES A new development, you said. Could you explain where its novelty lay?

V. Loginov First of all, in the very fact of such a document being adopted. We called on our partners in negotiations to concentrate on specific priorities topping the long list of internal problems, especially European ones, demanding an early solution.

I shall not quote this document, as it has been published. It's worth stressing, however, that among these priorities we include implementing the INF treaty; signing, in the first half of 1988, a USSR-U.S. treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms, with the ABM treaty observed; speeding up progress towards a complete and universal nuclear test ban; whipping into shape, before this year is out, the convention on banning chemical weapons and eliminating stockpiles thereof; completing, at an early date, the coordination of the agenda for the talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

NEW TIMES In short, these are top priorities not just for the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO but for Europe and mankind as a whole!

V. Loginov They are. What's more, this address of ours, this list of priorities can be regarded as an answer to the NATO summit's Brussels resolutions. This answer was a must because the Brussels summit came up not only with positive suggestions (which we by no means ignore!), such as an invitation to take part in negotiations on some aspects of disarmament (and not disarmament alone, for that matter), but with other concepts as well. For instance, there was talk of what is termed "compensation"—the modernization or replacement of weapons scrapped in the process of disarmament by new kinds. We reject such an approach outright. The address also contains concrete proposals, such as to exchange data on arms and armed forces, bring out and remove any asymmetries and imbalances; this is bound to silence the idle talk about the Warsaw Treaty countries' alleged military superiority in Europe.

NEW TIMES This assertion is quite current in the West. What is the actual state of affairs?

V. Loginov Indeed, in Central Europe, the Warsaw Treaty countries have a certain superiority in tanks and artillery. But then, besides Central Europe, there are the European flanks, northern and southern. The entire continent, from the Atlantic to the Urals, and all the adjacent seas and oceans, including the Baltic and the Mediterranean, should be regarded as an integral whole. Viewed from this angle, the picture is different. You will see, for instance, that on the southern flank, NATO is stronger many times over, and not just by so many percent.

The situation in the centre of Europe is also not as simple as all that. Our partners in negotiations are trying to restrict the discussion to the Soviet superiority in tanks and artillery. But what about tactical aviation, combat helicopters, anti-tank weapons? What about the naval forces, deployed on the flanks, and their carrier-borne aircraft which, incidentally, can easily span the entire European theatre of operations?

Everything must be taken into account!

This is what the Warsaw Treaty Organization members states insist upon in their address. When the other side suggests that we exchange data on the armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, our counter suggestion is that we include those deployed all over Europe, North, Centre and South alike. This would make the picture complete.

NEW TIMES This is only logical.

V. Loginov It certainly is. However, when Eduard Shevardnadze suggested this in Washington, our partners in negotiations had no ready answer.

In addressing the NATO countries and all the participants in the all-European process, we do not expect a prompt answer, either. We realize that it takes time to weigh all the pros and cons and give the matter thorough consideration. Let them study our proposal. After all is said and done, however, we expect a positive response. The nature of this response will show whether the proposal to exchange data was serious or intended as a propaganda ploy.

For our part, we are prepared to provide the necessary data. We regard the matter of data exchange as urgent, and suggest reaching an agreement on its principles in April and trading statistics in May so as to clear the air. All subsequent negotiations can then be conducted, and whatever asymmetries and imbalances exist can be put right, on the basis of concrete information.

This is a new approach to the issue of armed forces and arms reduction in Europe. The approach to deal with naval weapons we have suggested is also new. This is a very important matter. The buildup of naval forces and their presence in various parts of the world is of great danger to the cause of peace.

The participants in the session exchanged views on a wide range of subjects: the coming third special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament, the situation in the Middle East, the escalation of the Iran-Iraq armed conflict, the Afghan-Pakistani talks, the Cyprus problem. The questions of cooperation between the allied countries in the field of foreign policy also came in for discussion. All this is set forth in detail in the session's communiqué. I should stress that the consensus was that existing hotbeds of tension and armed conflicts must be dealt with as soon as possible by political methods. The Warsaw Treaty states are prepared to do everything to facilitate this.

NEW TIMES The West often claims that all suggestions coming from the Warsaw Treaty Organization are actually Soviet ones, and that the other participants in the alliance merely support and approve them. Does this really apply to the suggestions found in the address?

V. Loginov All of these suggestions are joint efforts and stem from our common positions. A look through the communique will show what specific initiatives individual Warsaw Treaty states have come up with. This is only natural. Within the framework of the coordinated movement for a nuclear-free and non-violent world, every country makes its contribution and advances its initiatives.

I mean, in particular, the GDR's and Czechoslovakia's proposals that a non-nuclear corridor and a chemical weapon-free zone be set up in Central Europe; the Balkan initiatives put forward by Bulgaria and Romania; the Polish plan for arms reduction and confidence building; the Czechoslovak package on establishing a zone of confidence, cooperation and good-neighbourly relations along the line of contact between the two alliances; and, finally, a very interesting initiative by Hungarian Communists who suggested, jointly with Finnish and Italian Social Democrats and Socialists, that non-nuclear countries should increase their contribution to all European disarmament processes, nuclear included.

NEW TIMES I see that the socialist world's foreign policy is fairly varied.

V. Loginov Uniformity is alien to life, and socialism is a living and developing organism.

Another important point is that we are the first to blaze the trail to the socialist ideal, and we often do so by trial and error. Various approaches, viewpoints and methods eventually crystallize into the most rational line, and this applies to foreign policy as well.

Finally, there are national specifics and a whole complex of concrete realities to be reckoned with when a national embarks on the socialist course. There can be no common recipes for building a new society to be followed by both a newly independent nation and by a nation with a long history of capitalist development behind it; One cannot fit everyone into the same pattern. [passage omitted on CEMA economic affairs]

NEW TIMES And now the last question. Having started out on your own as a carpenter, you have been an engineer, a Komsomol and Party worker, and gone all the way to becoming a career diplomat. What is it that brings you greatest fulfillment?

V. Loginov I feel satisfaction when I see that my work is useful, that a seed I have sown, or rather helped to sow, has sprouted.

NEW TIMES How do you feel about the outcome of the Sofia meeting?

V. Loginov I feel satisfied.

Approximate Balance, Force Assymetries in Europe Viewed

52001077 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 16, 16-22 Apr 88 p 5

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Nazarenko, candidate of military sciences, under the rubric "Alien 'Voices'": "Equality Built Up From Inequalities." Passages in boldface as published]

[Text] In the broadcasts of the "radio voices," recently the thesis that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have a decisive superiority over NATO in conventional armaments is frequently repeated. Hence the conclusion: For real disarmament, "in the highest degree an assymetrical cut on the part of the East" is demanded.

We asked Lieutenant Colonel V. Nazarenko, candidate of military sciences, for a commentary.

The conclusion on the approximate balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the area of armed forces and conventional armaments is based on a comparison of the military potentials of both blocs, assessed with the help of a methodology which adduces together and takes account of all factors—political, economic, geostrategic, and purely military. In particular, even the London Institute for Strategic Studies agrees with it, emphasizing in this connection that "the general balance of forces in conventional armaments is such that... neither side has enough aggregate power to guarantee victory."

Precisely aggregate power is the main criterion of the correlation of forces. Therefore it is necessary to compare, not separate types of armaments, but the military potentials of the sides taken as a whole. Only such an approach will give an objective picture of the correlation of combat capabilities of the opposing groupings.

In arguing the "superiority" of the Warsaw Pact countries no less than 20 French and Spanish divisions are ignored—a part of the armed forces under the national authority of the NATO countries. The bloc's reserve formations and warehoused supplies of weapons and military equipment are also not taken into account. On the other hand, military construction workers, the militia, border troops and even DOSAAF are counted in the Warsaw Pact countries' armed forces.

In the course of history it turned out that the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO developed differently. Naturally, their structure and organization turned out to be not of the same type. From this arose partial disproportions. For example:

The number of combat-ready units (divisions and brigades) in NATO is almost 1.5 times more than in the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, an American division has 1.5 times more personnel, and a West German one has twice as many.

While the Warsaw Pact has approximately 20,000 more tanks, NATO has almost 1,500 more attack aircraft and twice as many combat helicopters.

The North Atlantic alliance's superiority in naval forces is especially great. Thus, NATO has an advantage over the Warsaw Pact of almost three to one in large surface ships (battleships, cruisers, destroyers and missile frigates), of 2.5 to one in naval aircraft, and of two to one in overall tonnage of naval ships.

The Warsaw Pact countries are ready to consider ways to remove the above-noted disbalances and asymmetries on the level of the military alliances, but in such a way that the general correlation of forces, which at the present time is characterized by approximate equality, is not violated. In the matter of eliminating inequalities our approach is extremely simple: in those types of weapons of which the West has more (for example, tactical attack aircraft), let them carry out their own reductions, and in those types of which we have more (for example, tanks), we will on a mutual basis eliminate our own "excess."

The next step, directed toward a lowering of the level of military confrontation, is a reduction in forces and armaments to a level that will guarantee each side the ability to repel an attack and deal a shattering rebuff to the other under any conditions in which it unleashes an armed conflict (war); but a level which will not make possible offensive operations with decisive goals or, even more, a surprise attack.

For this it is necessary to reduce, to the minimum agreed level, the concentration of forces and armaments in the zone where the two alliances are in direct contact. The Warsaw Pact countries propose at first to reduce, on a mutual basis, in the course of one to two years, the number of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries' armed forces by from 100,000 to 150,000 men from each side, and then (in

the beginning of the 1990's), to carry out cuts in the opposing groupings of a further 25 per cent (of approximately 500,000 men from each side).

The limitation of the two sides' capabilities for a surprise attack would make possible the creation in various regions of zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons, zones of lowered concentrations of armaments, and also a nuclear-free corridor along the borderline between Warsaw Pact and NATO forces up to 300 kilometers wide (150 kilometers on each side).

It is plain to see that the entire structure of the forces and arsenals of the two sides should be transformed in such a manner that the Warsaw Pact's defensive capabilities be superior to NATO's offensive capabilities, and that NATO's defensive capabilities exceed the Warsaw Pact's offensive capabilities, at a substantially reduced level of military confrontation by the two alliances.

UD/330

Cranes Being Mounted on 'SS-20' Transporters
*LD2005211388 Moscow TASS in English 2045 GMT
20 May 88*

[Text] Odessa May 20 TASS—Work has begun on mounting the first crane on the transporter vehicle of a medium-range missile, known in the West as SS-20, at the heavy-duty crane plant in Odessa, a port city on the Black Sea. This work is done in accordance with the Soviet-U.S. treaty on intermediate and shorter-range missiles, under which nuclear weapons should be eliminated, while other hardware used for peaceful purposes. The machine builders in Odessa were instructed to manufacture mobile cranes for the construction, mounting them on missile chassis.

The Soviet side proposed partnership to the Swiss-West German firm Liebherr. An agreement was reached, under which the firm will begin a 120-tonne mechanism for the Odessa plant.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Defense Minister-Designate Skeptical of Soviet Peace Policy

DW051201 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 5 May 88 pp 1, 2

[Report by "DRUBCAS" on interview with Defense Minister-designate Rupert Scholz: "Scholz Warns Against Too Much Confidence in Soviet Disarmament Policy." Passage in boldface as published]

[Text] Bonn, 4 May—Defense Minister-designate Rupert Scholz [CDU] warned in an interview with SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG against assessing Soviet intentions erroneously in the current disarmament negotiations. "Gorbachev needs external calm, and he also needs domestic calm. Therefore, he needs a respite from the arms race," Scholz said. Defense expenditures burden the Soviet Union just as they do Western countries. However, the Soviet military doctrine "continues with its goal of making war wageable again" and becomes active where "revolutionary processes" are in motion.

The interview took place on Berlin Land representation premises [in Bonn] because Scholz is still senator for justice and federal affairs; he will take over his new job on 18 May. The future defense minister took a critical view of Gorbachev's role. He called Gorbachev's vision of a "European house" where all Europeans can live a "tempting and journalistically very skillful term." However, he does not rule out that behind the facade stands an "anti-American calculation" that would relativize the "trans-Atlantic linkage." The Soviet desire "to set in cement the status quo" represents no contradiction. Scholz defines the house as a building "where all Europeans can live, according to liberal principles, as they wish to live."

Scholz said what would happen if Gorbachev succeeded with the "enormous glasnost and perestroika experiment" would be "actually an interesting issue." In 10-20 years there might be a "modernized Russian economy with an industrial society, the characteristics of which would not be unlike those of a Western society with great pluralism." However, pluralism is incompatible with the "ideology of Marxism-Leninism." A Soviet discussion partner told him that the Soviet Union must master that walk on the edge, Scholz said. Scholz cannot imagine that it would be successful.

On the one hand, one must wish Gorbachev success in the sense that there will be more independence for the individual. On the other hand, Gorbachev, with the modernization of his country, has not given up "the systems race." On the contrary, the Soviets plan to become "better and stronger" with a more efficient economy. "That certainly includes more efficient weaponry." Soviet military publications have always included the principle of "making wars wageable." Although that military doctrine also says that the Soviet Union will not

be the first to attack, it still insists "that liberation movements are to be supported actively and aggressively." That means that for revolutionary movements anywhere in the world "class struggle solidarity is demanded—to include military means if necessary."

Scholz cited Gorbachev's formula of "asymmetric disarmament." He said that it was "something entirely new—the admission that they are superior." Scholz said that he considered that statement one of the most impressive and important statements made by Gorbachev. We would conclude from it that "he really intends to reduce weapons and in that way prevent wars." Scholz said that to make wars possible meant to give up nuclear weapons and return to conventional war. On the other hand, "Gorbachev is still a convinced Marxist-Leninist." And in his opinion the world revolution outside Soviet borders just could not take place without the Soviet Union's participation.

According to Scholz, the internal controversies and tensions in the Soviet Union have by no means been resolved. He says that "in a way, Gorbachev needs a respite. He needs calm at home, and therefore needs disarmament. If he wants to modernize such a backward economy as the Russian, it is obvious that he needs calm in the foreign policy area and in problems resulting from the arms race."

In his talk with SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG Scholz denied statements that he had introduced entirely new elements into the security discussion and had thereby taken a position counter to Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the FDP. Scholz, who has been a member of the CDU since 1983, said that was "real nonsense." He said he differed with some SPD politicians like Egon Bahr, for instance. But he had "always worked well with Genscher in Berlin and Germany policy matters during the time I was a member of the Senate. We were on good terms. Nobody can say I am at war with Genscher." Personally, there is no problem, he said. However, he considered it objectionable and questionable "for people to believe that detente automatically entails disarmament." Logic shows the opposite, he said. Everybody wants disarmament, but it has to be "accompanied by progress in political detente." There is a linkage between political detente and disarmament, Scholz said.

Indeed, it was "impossible to achieve lasting detente as long as the division of Germany and Europe lasts." In that respect he definitely disagreed with the SPD. He did not share Egon Bahr's view that defining the existing borders in Europe would lead to stability, stability would lead to detente, and that would allow us to reduce weapons. In reality, people rejected the borders because those borders locked them in. The real job is to advance human rights and self-determination. If the people of the GDR said in a free vote: "We are exercising our right of self-determination in the sense that we are staying here and do not want to join the majority of the other

Germans who could outvote us at any time," that would have to be respected, Scholz said. Those who have been denied the right of self-determination must decide their own fate.

However, in a European framework the "option of a national state" continued "to exist." A united Europe and a German national state were not mutually exclusive. The process of West Europe's integration could never be at the expense of Germans writing off other Germans. "The West European and then all-European process of integration implies that we must keep all options open," Scholz stressed.

Regarding the statement made by CDU politician Volker Ruehe on the German-Polish treaty and the political bond it creates, Scholz said that the treaty had its "politically justified effect under the circumstances in which it was concluded." The German reich continues as a "non-functioning subject of international law." "Both German states are subject to the proviso that the German reich continues to exist." They were never warring powers, and therefore it is impossible to conclude two peace treaties with them, as suggested by Egon Bahr.

As to the rest, the senator agreed with the Germany policy formulations adopted by the CDU for its Wiesbaden congress. He participated in the preparations, pointing out that normative factors had to be separated from operational factors. For example, the statement that the goal of German unity could only be achieved by Germans with the consent of their neighbors in East and West was not a normative principle. Now that formula has been changed to meet current requirements, Scholz said.

**Genscher Urges 'Peaceful Cooperation',
'Conventional Stability'**

*LD0505124688 Hamburg DPA in German
1141 GMT 5 May 88*

[Text] Strasbourg (DPA) — Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has stressed the Soviet Union's readiness for peace and its desire for disarmament. The Soviet Union is not interested in waging a war "but is interested, as we are, in peaceful cooperation to our mutual benefit," declared Genscher on the sidelines of the 82d sitting of the ministerial committee of the Council of Europe on Thursday in Strasbourg in a conversation with DPA.

Genscher cited conventional stability at the lowest level possible as the most important task now on the agenda. "It is also a matter of creating cooperative security structures between East and West, which make the waging of war impossible because they eliminate the capability of a surprise attack and a territory-grabbing offensive," declared the foreign minister, who did not wish to directly state his position on the comments of Federal Defense Minister-Designate Rupert Scholz (CDU) in the Thursday edition of SUEDEDEUTSCHE

ZEITUNG. Scholz had warned in the interview about the Soviet military principle of "making it possible to wage wars" and about placing too much trust in Soviet disarmament policy. The Federal foreign minister pointed to the "encouraging developments" in Soviet politics in recent years. He especially stressed the Soviet readiness for on-site monitoring of disarmament measures, the agreement to the Western aim of the worldwide elimination of medium-range missiles, the decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, and the favorable development in the numbers of people leaving the Soviet Union. "The new leadership in Moscow has allowed actions to follow their words," Genscher said. We must now use these opportunities by developing a realistic policy in the Western alliance.

NATO's Carrington Against Denuclearization

*LD0505143188 Hamburg DPA in German
1330 GMT 5 May 88*

[Excerpts] Bonn/Brussels (DPA) — NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington, speaking on a farewell visit to Bonn, warned against a denuclearization of Europe and said the most modern nuclear weapons continue to be necessary for deterrence. In an address to the German Foreign Affairs Society on Thursday, Carrington said that short-range nuclear weapons must not be seen as an "isolated problem" for the FRG.

No one denies the "overconcentration of short-range nuclear weapons in Germany," Lord Carrington said in his address. "But it is not good to decide in favor of a medicine that is worse than the disease." It is "impossible to build up hopes of a denuclearization of Europe before one deals with the threat from conventional weapons."

Short-range weapons "can and must be maintained," Lord Carrington said. This must happen in the framework of a policy which reduces nuclear weapons wherever possible, one which discusses the ranges of new weapon systems carefully as a consequence of the "necessary modernization," and one which stands in the overall context of a disarmament strategy. However, it must be recognized "that we must live for the foreseeable future with nuclear weapons at the most modern level if we want a stable and war-free Europe and a strong alliance", Carrington said.

Short-range missiles are "part of NATO's deterrent stance as a whole, part of the indivisible security of all alliance countries and part of the joint obligation to joint defenses." After the alliance persuaded the Soviet Union, by stationing intermediate-range weapons, to reach the INF accord on the elimination of those weapons, the objective is now to maintain nuclear weapons to negotiate and "to modernize wherever necessary to maintain effectiveness."

"The participation of the European alliance members in the nuclear process" is crucial for the U.S. strategic "nuclear umbrella." This means not only political support but also "the stationing and operation of a range of systems of various ranges and types which is widely distributed throughout the area." "By sharing the nuclear burden we can enjoy the benefit."

The West must continue to seek verifiable disarmament agreements. It should not allow itself to be placed under any pressure of time, however. Negotiations on conventional stability are above all necessary. Possible reductions in nuclear short-range weapons also depend on this.

Even in the FRG, which bears such a great share of the defense burden, the trend in the development of military expenditure is "not encouraging," Carrington said. The demographic problem, in particular, raises the question of whether the critical point has not already been reached. "The euphoria of detente" does not create the best climate for maintaining defense expenditure. The impression is gaining ground above all in the United States that "a richer and stronger Europe" must assume a larger share of the joint defense burden.

Genscher Hits New Defense Minister on Soviet Goals, Doctrine

DW061141 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 6 May 88 p 1

[Egbert Moerbitz article: "Genscher Contradicts Scholz"]

[Text] Bonn, 5 May—Some 14 days before the nomination of Berlin Federal Senator Rupert Scholz (CDU) as the new defense minister, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) contradicted Scholz' assessment of Mikhail Gorbachev's intentions and of Soviet military doctrine. During several interviews Scholz had warned against "euphoric Gorbachevism" and said that the Soviet military doctrine's goal was to make wars "wageable" again. On Thursday before the European Council Ministerial Committee in Strasbourg, Genscher stated that the West could be successful only "if we resist the danger of constantly assuming the worst case conceivable when it comes to relations with the Soviet Union."

Genscher added that disarmament also involved dispensing with enemy images. The "correct" assessment of Soviet intentions leads to the conclusion that Moscow has no interest in the "wageability of wars in Europe." Therefore, the Soviet Union's support "must be won for cooperative security structures that completely rule out the danger of war in Europe for a long time." The development that has been actuated by Gorbachev has a "revolutionary character." The West could not determine where that development would lead, he said.

Without mentioning the defense minister-designate, Genscher said he warned against underrating the domestic dynamics of the development process in the Soviet Union, because there also were "irreversibilities." Most of all, nobody should "paralyze himself by sticking to outdated enemy images at a time that requires Western dynamism." Without confidence in the rationality and the sense of responsibility of the Soviet leadership, nuclear deterrence becomes a "risk to ourselves."

Defense Minister Woerner on Security Needs, Conventional Disarmament

DW060946 Hamburg BILD in German 6 May 88 p 10

[Interview granted by Defense Minister Manfred Woerner to unidentified correspondent—date and place not given]

[Text] BILD: How do you assess Gorbachev's policy?

Woerner: Gorbachev has not stopped rearming in the nuclear and conventional fields. Therefore, we must watch out. We cannot make our security depend on Mr Gorbachev. Our security must be based on our own efforts. Only in that way will there be a chance of achieving progress in East-West relations. It can only be in our interest for Gorbachev to prevail in opening up the Soviet system. An open Soviet system will be better for cooperation and for building confidence than a closed system.

BILD: Will the future NATO Secretary Woerner go to Moscow?

Woerner: Matters have not developed that far, but I could imagine that.

BILD: Why are there no summit meetings between NATO and Warsaw Pact defense ministers?

Woerner: That is a dream of the future. At the moment it is a matter of achieving progress in conventional disarmament through clear negotiations. Conventional disarmament is the actual test of Soviet policy credibility. I expect that Gorbachev will do what he says: Whoever has more, should disarm more.

BILD: The SPD wants to reduce the Bundeswehr to 350,000 men....

Woerner: In view of the numerical superiority facing us and in view of the length of the border we must defend, 350,000 men will not suffice. Even new technology cannot substitute for personnel. With 350,000 men we would have to give up forward defense [vorverteidigung]. If we reduced the Bundeswehr, our allies would also reduce. The Americans would withdraw troops. The Belgians and the British would also.

BILD: Is the "women in the Bundeswehr" issue over?

Woerner: No, I would very much like to have female volunteers in the Armed Forces without weapons. We are investigating that. Legal problems have arisen. A final answer cannot yet be given.

BILD: Are there any more such mixed units as the German-French brigade?

Woerner: The setting up of a German-French brigade is a prototype. I do not rule out such units with other alliance partners. Initial talks have taken place, for example, with the Dutch.

BILD: Will your designated successor Rupert Scholz face more or fewer difficulties than you have?

Woerner: He will be in a better starting position. The Bundeswehr is in good shape. It is stronger and better prepared for action. The personnel situation is better today than it ever was before. That pertains to equipment also and to the quality of leadership. On the other hand, the problems that will arise in the nineties will be more difficult than those before because of personnel and financial problems.

Lomeyko Speaks on 'Structural Nonaggression Capability'

*LD1005210988 Hamburg DPA in German
1741 GMT 10 May 88*

[Text] Bonn (DPA) —The Soviet Union supports a "structural nonaggression capability" as the aim of conventional disarmament in Europe. Soviet special envoy, Vladimir Lomeyko, emphasized today to journalists in Bonn that at this stage everyone should possess only defensive capability, not offensive.

The diplomat and former Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman is lobbying in Bonn for confidence in the reform policies of the Soviet leadership. If "restructuring" fails, its supporters will be to blame, not its opponents, declared Lomeyko.

Confidence is the most important prerequisite for European political agreement in "the common European home." On this issue Lomeyko is especially courting the Federal Republic's cooperation. Lomeyko, who was taking part in an event organized by West German Radio (WDR) to commemorate the 43rd anniversary of the end of the war, said that on this issue Moscow is certainly mindful of U.S.-European ties.

Kohl Writes GDR's Honecker on East Berlin NFZ Meeting

*LD1105112588 Hamburg DPA in German
1031 GMT 11 May 88*

[Text] Bonn (DPA) — Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, chairman of the CDU, in a letter to SED General Secretary Erich Honecker has explained why neither he nor a delegation from his party will take part in the

international meeting for nuclear weapons-free zones to be held in East Berlin. Kohl emphasized in his letter, published today by the CDU, that his party does not consider the setting up of a nuclear weapons-free zone in central Europe a suitable start to improving European security.

"Given this well-known difference of opinion it does not seem to me to be fruitful that I or representatives of the CDU take part in your 'international meeting.'" Kohl supports the two German states working for a constructive policy of securing peace in Europe within their own alliance systems.

The CSU also will not take part in the meeting in East Berlin. The SPD and FDP and their youth organizations intend to send delegations.

Kohl's letter to Honecker says that the nuclear weapons systems deployed there are not the determining factor for the nuclear threat to a region; rather it is the possibility of reaching this territory with nuclear weapons. "A mere moving apart of nuclear arsenals would only achieve an illusion of security."

In view of the Warsaw Pact's considerable conventional superiority in Europe, a nuclear weapons-free zone would endanger stability. Kohl pleaded for treating disarmament issues not in isolation but in the complete context of the removal of the conventional imbalance.

Munich—In a letter to SED General Secretary Erich Honecker, CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss explained his decision to decline the invitation by saying that he does not consider the abolition of all nuclear weapons possible in the foreseeable future. Even the concept of "nuclear weapons-free zones" is designed to arouse false expectations since even in the case of an agreement these zones could be attacked with nuclear warheads.

For Strauss, the first precondition for the destruction of all nuclear weapons is a balance of conventional forces on the two sides, which can be achieved only by asymmetrical disarmament. The problem of respecting and monitoring a ban on nuclear weapons is more difficult. "What we need are not nuclear weapons-free zones but a war-free world." We therefore have the common task of realistically researching the causes of tension and reducing the differences connected with them.

Genscher Comments on Shultz' NATO Briefing, INF, CSCE

*LD1305155088 Hamburg DPA in German
1236 GMT 13 May 88*

[Excerpts] Brussels—The United States' NATO partners are urging an early U.S. Senate ratification of the INF Treaty on eliminating land-based intermediate-range nuclear weapons even before the U.S.-Soviet summit in Moscow at the end of May.

Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said that the U.S. secretary of state's report was "encouraging." The alliance did not regard the INF treaty "as a U.S.-Soviet agreement, but as a treaty of the alliance."

The intermediate-range missile treaty was "also an important contribution to the unity, solidarity and cohesion of the Western alliance," said Genscher. In Europe, the treaty prompted the hope that it "represents the starting point for a large-scale disarmament process." The signing of the INF agreement was "naturally a step which required parliamentary support in the spirit of trust-building." There must be no repeat of what happened with the SALT-2 Treaty on strategic arms when there was no longer a majority in the U.S. Senate for its ratification.

Shultz and Genscher met for a discussion after the NATO meeting in Brussels, which focused largely on the "overall concept" of disarmament which the alliance

was working on. In Bonn's view, decisions on modernizing, particularly short-range nuclear weapons, could only be made after this concept was ready.

Genscher said that the fact that the administration of Ronald Reagan was meeting fully its international responsibilities up to the end of its term of office was "a great encouragement in view of the real opportunities presented by current developments in West-East relations". Such periods must be used "to seal as many disarmament agreements, agreements on other bilateral political issues and cooperation to solve regional issues as possible." He hoped that the coming summit "in Moscow and on the road to Moscow" would make clear progress toward a balanced result at the Vienna CSCE conference and that the talks currently in the preparatory stage on conventional arms would be supported. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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